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Abstract

Deliberative democratic theory emphasizes deliberation as central to the health of
democracy. It has grown to be one of the most active and popular stands of political
theory. In response to criticisms that deliberative democracy was unworkable at the large
scale, the field made a systemic turn and now conceives of political communities as
potential deliberative systems. While advancements have been made in measuring the
quality of deliberation that occurs in deliberative forums, the practice of measuring the
quality of deliberative systems is in its infancy. Authors have proposed various
theoretical paths to assessing deliberative systems but no standardized method capable of
producing replicable results exists. In this thesis, I offer two contributions to the ongoing
discussion of the measure of deliberative systems. The first contribution is a proposal and
outline of a process-based method for assessing and aggregating the components of
deliberative systems into a single score. The second contribution is an argument that we
can use a measure of meta-consensus among the members of a polity to indirectly
measure the quality of a deliberative system.
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Chapter 1

Defining Deliberation

1.1 - Why Deliberation Matters

Governments of all types benefit from stability that comes with legitimacy. This is
especially true in democracies, where people are relatively free to dissent. For theorists of
deliberative democracy, deliberation is the primary source of democracy’s legitimacy.
The survival of a democracy depends in large part on the quality of its intersubjective,
political deliberation, i.e. of its deliberative democracy. High quality deliberation is
crucial for stable democracies.
Assessing the deliberativeness of democratic states enables us to estimate the
health of a democracy. A measurement of deliberative democracy will help us
differentiate superficially stable democracies from healthy democracies capable of
enduring adversity. Assuming that the measurement is valid and accurate, it will also help
us learn what works for fostering high quality deliberative democracy.
An understanding of deliberative democracy is increasingly important at the
present moment. Across the globe, and especially in the United States, democratic
institutions are experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. In addition, information warfare
assaults on democracies are increasingly common. Good deliberation can help protect
democracy from these assaults and from more typical backsliding. Such is the motivation
behind this thesis, and behind the field of deliberative democracy more generally.
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1.2 - Extant Definitions of Deliberation

There is no agreed upon definition of deliberation. Some definitions keep
deliberation pure and inherently desirable while other definitions reduce and broaden
deliberation to discussion of almost any kind. Uncertainty about deliberative ends invites
criticisms of something that is not actually deliberation. Confusion about the definition of
deliberation results in a multitude of criticisms, many of which do not apply to
deliberation in a normative sense. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007) For instance, Iris Marion
Young conceives of deliberation as being synonymous with formal argument, then
criticizes deliberation for excluding alternative communication styles such as greeting,
rhetoric, and storytelling. (Young 2001) But other theorists welcome the inclusion of
those communication styles that Young excludes. (Gambetta 1998; Mansbridge 2007)
A crucial distinction between definitions of deliberation is whether deliberation
includes reason. A weak definition is one that lacks a reference to reason and conceives
of deliberation as any communication aimed at changing preferences. By such a
definition, deliberation is not intrinsically desirable as communication aimed at changing
preferences can be either good or bad. On the other hand, a strong definition requires that
deliberation be rational, and may have additional requirements such as inclusion and
equality. Habermas may be the closest to such a conception of deliberation as he
describes deliberation as a process in which the force of the better argument prevails and
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is the only force employed. He argues that deliberation should contain nothing but “the
forceless force of the better argument.” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 17) By strong
definitions, deliberation is intrinsically desirable, although perhaps impossible as perfect
rationality is unattainable and unknowable. Even though actual discussion falls short of
ideal deliberation, the standard of ideal deliberation still has a steering effect on
discussion.
James D. Fearon offers a choice between definitions of deliberation depending on
whether one or more individuals are involved. For multiple individuals, deliberation is a
particular sort of discussion that involves reason. For a lone individual, deliberation is an
internal process of weighing reasons. (Fearon 1998) While Fearon’s definitions both
reference reason, they stop short of requiring rationality. I consider these to be moderate
definitions, i.e. neither strong nor weak. Joshua Cohen also has a moderate definition in
which reason is referenced but not required. “[U]nless the reasonableness is aimed at by
participants in the process, we do not have deliberation.” (Cohen 2007, 221)
“Participation, even discursive participation, is not the same as deliberation.” (Cohen
2007, 223) According to Cohen, rational collective decision making must be attempted
by the participants in order to qualify as deliberation. As mentioned earlier, it is up for
debate whether individuals ever actually cease pursuing solely their own self-interest.
Adam Przeworski seems slightly confused on the definition of deliberation.
Despite explicitly offering a definition with no mention of reason, Przeworski alludes to
deliberation with the phrase “free, equal, and reasoned public discussion." (Przeworski
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1998, 141) This minor contradiction suggests that that reason may be an assumed
component of deliberation.
While I intend to offer a moderate definition in the next section, one could utilize
a strong or weak definition and still arrive at agreement on a measure of quality of
deliberation. Regardless of whether deliberation includes most discussions, or only
perfectly rational discussions that never actually occur in the real world, a shared measure
of the quality of deliberation could be how closely actual discussion approximates the
ideal of rational, egalitarian discourse. A moderate definition welcomes less-than-rational
discussion into the category of deliberation while still distinguishing between good and
bad deliberation.
There are two common reference points from which to define deliberation. One of
these is to define it in terms of its form or appearance. These definitions often describe
deliberation as a process. James Fishkin defines deliberation as “the process by which
individuals sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in discussion together.”
(Fishkin 2014, 31) Cohen offers a similar definition but adds a reference to making a
decision: “Deliberation, generically understood, is about weighing the reasons relevant to
a decision with a view to making a decision on the basis of that weighing.” (Cohen 2007,
219) Diego Gambetta defines deliberation such that it precedes but is distinct from a
decision. Deliberation is "a conversation whereby individuals speak and listen
sequentially before making a collective decision." (Gambetta 1998, 19) Archon Fung also
defines deliberation as a process, but adds an additional egalitarian criteria on the type of
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reasons that are permissible. He writes, deliberation is “a process of public discussion in
which participants offer proposals and justifications to support collective decisions.
These proposals are backed by justifications that appeal to other participants and by
reasons that others can accept.” (Fung 2007, 163) We can see a similar egalitarian
concern combined with a reference to reason and the epistemic possibility of better and
worse decisions in the work of Mendelberg and Karpowitz who define deliberation as
follows:

“a public discussion that is ‘reflective, open to a wide range of evidence,
respectful of different views. It is a rational process of weighing the
available data, considering alternative possibilities, arguing about
relevance and worthiness, and then choosing the best policy or person’
(Walzer, 1997: 1-2). Deliberation, ideally, is a process of communication
in which people must address needs and perspectives quite different from
their own. Those needs and perspectives are conveyed through reasoned
arguments that are universal and generalizable, drawing on basic
understandings with which other participants can agree (Chambers, 1996;
Gutmann and Thompson, 1996).” (Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007, 102)

Jon Elster offers a process based definition of deliberation that stands apart from
others for its novel position of deliberation relative to other forms of communication.
Elster argues that, excluding violence, there are three ways in which a group can make a
decision: arguing, bargaining, and voting. Arguing and bargaining are at opposite ends of
a spectrum while voting is an aggregation mechanism apart from the spectrum. Elster
claims that deliberation is essentially a form of arguing. In addition, the place of
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deliberation in group decision making is secured by the fact that "arguing is logically
prior to all other modes of collective decision making." (Elster 1998b, 10) A group can
only agree to decide by voting after an argument has been made to use voting.
The other common way to define deliberation is by reference to its purpose, i.e.
what it is intended to accomplish. Of course, many of these definitions also make
reference to the process as well. One alleged purpose of deliberation is to produce
superior decisions compared to those made without preceding deliberation. This is the
view of James Bohman who defines public deliberation as “a dialogical process of
exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be
settled without interpersonal coordination and cooperation." (Bohman 1996, 27)
Bohman’s comment here is rather broad and compatible with many other definitions. For
instance, Joshua Cohen argues that the goal of deliberation is to produce consensus.
“[D]eliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus - to find reasons that
are persuasive to all." (Cohen, as quoted by Przeworski 1998, 141) Simone Chambers
differs from Cohen in this regard. She writes,

“deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable,
well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise
preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by
fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of
deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests an
overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as
justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation. (2003: 309)”
(Simone Chambers, as quoted in Warren 2007, 277)
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She clearly disagrees that consensus is the primary goal of deliberation and appears to
place legitimacy beside the production of reasonable, well-informed opinions as a
primary aim. Przeworski defines deliberation as if its purpose is to change opinions, but
not necessarily towards consensus or rationality. Deliberation is "a form of discussion
intended to change the preferences on the bases of which people decide how to act."
(Przeworski 1998, 140) Jon Elster argues that the primary aim of argument in a decision
making process is the transformation of derived preferences. Fundamental preferences
may be unamenable to reason, but derived preferences tend to be factual matters on
which a person can change their mind, and on which a group may approach consensus.
(Elster 1998b) Finally, John Dryzek lists roughly nine different goals which theorists
desire from deliberation. In addition to those mentioned above, his list includes increased
political equality, a more competent citizenry, and an easier time solving public problems.
(Dryzek 2007)
A third, and less common way to define deliberation is in reference, not to what it
intends to produce, but what it does produce, either ideally or in actuality. Susan Stokes
defines

deliberation

as

"endogenous

change

of

preferences

resulting

from

communication." (Stokes 1998, 123) An oversimplification of a scientific worldview
might argue that deliberation produces knowledge. For Habermas, ideal deliberation
would produce a complete and rational consensus. (Habermas 1984) Elster agrees,
writing that “a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences” (Elster,
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as quoted in Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 499). Goold et al. offer a conception of
deliberation as a process that produces changes in opinions as well as increasing
satisfaction and confidence with outputs. (Goold et al. 2012) Some theorists argue that
deliberation produces stable outputs, free from manipulation, that are epistemically
superior by virtue of being closer to the objectively correct answer. (Cohen 1997; Estlund
1997)
In the next section I offer my definition of deliberation and clarify my
stance/assumptions on many of the disputes within deliberative democratic theory. Then I
shift from small scale deliberation up to the scale of the country where deliberative
democracy is the operative concept. I review definitions of deliberative democracy and
offer my own.

1.3 - Deliberation Defined

I offer a moderate definition of deliberation, one which includes reference to the
use of reason but does not require actual objective rationality. Under my definition,
deliberation aims at, but never achieves perfect rationality. It is sufficient that the
participants make a genuine effort to employ the use of reason. My definition is as
follows:
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Deliberation is the use of the human capacity to reason in the consideration of
possibilities in order to inform a decision by identifying better and worse options.

Note the four components of this definition. The first that deliberation includes
reason, but not perfect reason, only a level of reason of which humans are capable.
Deliberation is more than discussion by virtue of its aiming at rationality, but deliberation
does not require ideal rationality. This is what makes the definition moderate. The second
component is the consideration of possibilities. I mean this in the broadest sense.
Possibilities includes possible choices but also possible factual states of affairs, causal
connections, and any other matters worth consideration for purposes of the decision.
The third component is the point that deliberation informs a decision. More
specifically, deliberation informs a decision making process about reasons and their
respective validity. A decision may regard various courses of action, but often the
decision is simply what one is to believe about a matter. When multiple people are
involved, deliberation often fails to produce a decision and so is not a decision making
method. When it results in consensus, then it makes sense to say that the decision was
made by deliberation. But in the vast majority of cases, deliberation merely precedes a
decision making method. The fact that deliberation is not a decision making method
changes little about deliberation’s relation to decisions. Theorists are still interested in the
effect that deliberation can have on decision making processes and the two remain closely
linked.
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The fourth component is the identification of better and worse options. This is to
stress the epistemic nature of deliberation. Probabilistically, deliberation is more likely
than not to produce objectively superior outcomes compared to other methods of
informing a decision. It has a tendency to be more correct than other methods. One of the
ways that it does this is by connecting particular claims to general principles.
There are some consequences of the offered definition of deliberation. The most
explicit is that deliberation is epistemic in nature. Second is that deliberation, by this
definition, actually occurs in the real world. Third, deliberation does not require multiple
people. “An individual can make decisions deliberatively” (Cohen 2007, 219). And
because a lone individual can deliberate, and is very likely to arrive at consensus,
deliberation can be considered a decision making process when only one person is
involved.

1.4 - Deliberative Democracy Defined

The definition of deliberation given above requires only a single person, but
deliberative democratic theory is primarily concerned with deliberation between multiple
people, i.e. intersubjective deliberation. It is a type of discussion constrained by norms
that include honesty and equality. Intersubjective deliberation aims at a common good, at
least of the participants. This is not to say that individuals do not attempt to exploit the
deliberation process for self-interest, but that such behavior is not openly permissible.
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Intersubjective deliberation does not guarantee consensus in the same way that a
lone deliberator does and thus deliberation cannot be a method of decision making as it
regularly fails to produce decisions. Even though deliberation is technically not a
decision making method, it is still possible to evaluate the decisions that are produced by
processes that include deliberation. We can still assess the outputs of decision processes
that follow after deliberation. Questions about decisions made by deliberation can be
rephrased as questions about decisions preceded by deliberation with little significant
difference. The central concern remains deliberation’s effect on decision making
processes, outputs, and outcomes.
In order to be objective and rational, intersubjective deliberation ought to be
inclusive, egalitarian, reciprocal, and noncoercive. Of course these are ideals to be aimed
at and their perfect realization is impossible. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007) To the extent
that deliberation approximates these ideals, it should be capable of selecting against
misinformation, with this tendency increasing as the quality of deliberation increases.
Intersubjective deliberation has the potential to increase consensus, though these results
are not guaranteed. It seems likely that deliberation is probabilistically more likely to
increase consensus, and especially meta-consensus, than not. This tendency is likely to be
stronger when the quality of deliberation is higher.
Intersubjective deliberation may be thought of as an attempt at collective
consciousness. For an individual faced with a novel problem, the best solution tool is
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consciousness. For a collective, the tool is collective consciousness made manifest via the
exchanging and rational comparison of ideas and lessons on possible solutions.
Another type of deliberation, one that can be done by an individual or
intersubjectively, is political deliberation. Here, I draw from Przeworksi who writes that,
"[d]eliberation is 'political' when it leads to a decision binding on a community."
(Przeworski 1998, 140) Thus, political deliberation is deliberation that results in a
binding decision on a community. Note that the decision is not necessarily aimed at a
common good, though it could be. Also worth pointing out is that there is nothing
necessarily democratic about political deliberation. “Deliberation is not an intrinsically
democratic matter.” (Cohen 2007, 219) Oligarchs and dictators can deliberate.
I offer that deliberative democracy is essentially a combination of intersubjective
and political deliberation that is aimed at the common good. It seems that the criteria of
aiming at a common good could be intrinsic to intersubjective deliberation or included
due to the addition of democracy depending on how one conceives of them. I will
mention a few definitions from others before offering my own.

Przeworski offers a

bare bones definition wherein "'democratic political deliberation' occurs when discussion
leads to a decision by voting." (Przeworski 1998, 140) This definition may be sufficient
but more nuance is possible.
Rosenberg defines citizen deliberation, not quite the same as democratic
deliberation, as "a joint, cooperative process of clarifying, elaborating, and revising
common conceptions and values, in the course of defining specific problems and
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determining how they should be addressed." (Rosenberg 2007a, 8) Rosenberg does not
explicitly mention values such as equality and inclusivity, but they are implied as they are
crucial to the process described.
Jon Elster defines deliberative democracy as the combination of democracy and
deliberation, both of which he also defines. Democracy is "collective decision making
with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives"
(Elster 1998b, 8). Deliberation is "decision making by means of arguments offered by and
to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality" (Elster
1998b, 8). Thus, deliberative democracy is "decision making by discussion among free
and equal citizens," (Elster 1998b, 1) Elster is explicit about the requirement that citizens
be free (uncoerced) and equal. Inclusivity of all citizens is implied.
Similar to Elster, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson “define deliberative
democracy as a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that
are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions
that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.”
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 3) This definition has most of the traits I have been
discussing. There is a moderate use of reason, an implication of inclusivity and equality
in the type of reasons that are acceptable, and mention that the decision is at least
temporarily binding on citizens.
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Joshua Cohen offers a brief definition of deliberative democracy in which much
hangs on the meaning of deliberation. According to Cohen, a deliberative democracy is
“an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members.”
(Cohen 1997, 67) In addition, Cohen provides a complementary and lucid description of
the traits of deliberative democracy that warrants quoting him at length. He essentially
conceives of deliberative democracy as the combination of the use of reason and equality.

“Democracy is a way of making binding, collective decisions that
connects those decisions to the interests and judgements of those whose
conduct is regulated by the decisions. The essential idea is that those
subject to the decisions are treated as equals by the process of making the
decisions, including agenda-setting and preferences formation, as well as
collective decision-making. Democracy is also a kind of society - a society
of equals…. [T]he point of deliberative democracy is to subject the
exercise of collective power to reason’s discipline, to what Habermas
famously described as ‘the force of the better argument,’ not the advantage
of the better situated. ...And not just the process of reasoning, but the
content of the reasons themselves must have a connection to the
democratic concept of people as equals. In short, the ideal of deliberative
democracy is to discipline collective power through the common reason of
a democratic public: democracy’s public reason. Deliberative
democracy… is a distinctive interpretation of democracy: democracy, no
matter how fair and no matter how participatory, is not deliberative unless
actual reasoning is central to the process of collective decision-making.”
(Cohen 2007, 219–20)

It can be seen here that Cohen’s brief definition of democratic deliberation intends to
imply the traits I have been mentioning more explicitly, such as equality, inclusion,
reason, and noncoercion. If my definition of deliberation, offered above, is utilized, then
14
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Joshua Cohen’s definition of deliberative democracy may be eloquent and complete,
containing or implying all of the traits that I argue are necessary components of
deliberative democracy.
Even so, I will make a slight adjustment to Cohen’s definition. His definition does
not require that the group deliberating be made up of citizens and that the deliberation is
in some way taking place at a country-wide scale. However this appears to be what most
deliberative democracy theorists have in mind when writing. Thus, I will reserve the term
deliberative democracy for associations that are coextensive with the citizenry of a
nation-state. I suggest that the concept Cohen so well described be instead associated
with the term democratic deliberation.
The definition of deliberative democracy that will be operative in this thesis is as
follows:

Deliberative Democracy is the use of the human capacity to reason, applied by a free and
equal citizenry, in consideration of the merits of various possibilities, so as to inform a
decision, aimed at a common good, and binding upon citizens of that nation-state.

This definition includes the three core components from the definition of deliberation but
also the criteria that the association be a nation-state, that all the citizenry be included and
equally empowered, and that the deliberation aims at a common good. Democratic
deliberation emphasizes a societal perspective, rather than an individual perspective.

15

MCCORMICK

Proposals that are acceptable to free and equal individuals are necessarily phrased in
terms of a common good. It is assumed that the nation-state must be a democracy as the
preconditions of a free and equal citizenry can only be found in democracies. Mark E.
Warren corroborates this point, arguing that theories of deliberative democracy aim to
foster communicative influence via deliberation as the dominant form of conflict
resolution. But deliberation is likely too fragile to occur outside of strong states that grant
rights. Perhaps ironically, deliberation is dependent upon non-deliberative institutions
that it cannot replace and must be woven into. (Warren 2007)
A number of theorists think of deliberative democracy more as a goal than a
study. John Dryzek acknowledges that deliberative democratic theory is not a falsifiable
hypothesis, but a project with a goal. (Dryzek 2007, 250) As deliberative democratic
theory develops, deliberation more closely approaches the ideal of democracy than
perhaps any other form of citizen participation. (Weatherford and McDonnell 2007)
Again, Cohen is especially informative. He argues that deliberative democracy is about
tying the exercise of power to conditions of public reasoning. The goal is to establish
conditions under which a public will can be discursively formed and foster the
communicative power that results in the institutionalized impact of such a public will on
political power. (Cohen 1998)
But deliberative democracy might suffer from idealism. Deliberative democracy
idealizes “political autonomy based on practical reasoning of citizens.” (Bohman and
Rehg 1997a, ix) Indeed, the goal of deliberative democracy, according to James Bohman,
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is quite a high bar: “to resolve the increasingly common conflicts without surrendering
the political equality of citizens, the non-tyranny of outcomes, and the publicity of
dialogue." (Bohman 1996, 69)
My task in this thesis is not to decide whether deliberative democratic theory is
overly idealistic, but rather to suggest a method by which to measure the extent to which
a nation-state approximates the ideal of deliberative democracy. For obvious reasons,
deliberative democracy is unlikely to occur in non-democratic regimes. The work
contained in this thesis is only intended to apply to democratic states. Even though the
conceptual model of deliberative systems that I will put forward is potentially capable of
being applied to any system, one of the measurement methods is really only useful in
democratic states. This is because only in democracies can you find a sufficiently free
press, free and fair elections, and a polity with the political and civil liberties required for
deliberation.
In the next section I will discuss the differences between good and bad
deliberation. Then in the following section I will discuss the consequences of a systemic
understanding of deliberative democracy for distinguishing between good and bad
deliberation.

1.5 - Disputes regarding Deliberation
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There are many disputes between deliberative democracy theorists. The chosen
definitions have consequences for these issues of disagreement. Bear in mind that the
function or role of deliberation in a democracy is a crucial component of its definition.
How do theorists conceive of deliberation’s role? What are the diverse ways that
deliberation is understood by those who advocate for it? How does deliberative
democratic theory conceive of deliberation? On what points do deliberative democrats
agree and on what points are they in disagreement? Particular resolutions of these
disputes have relevance for selecting an appropriate measurement of deliberation.
The first important dispute is whether or not deliberation is a recent addition to
democracy. Jon Elster argues that deliberation is implied in democratic foundations. As
evidence of his claim, Elster offers the following quotation of Pericles, as quoted by
Thucydides, eulogizing Athens in the 5th century B.C.:

"Our public men have, besides politics their private affairs to attend to,
and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry,
are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, we
regard the citizen who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but
as useless, and we are able to judge proposals even if we cannot originate
them; instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of
action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.
(Thucydides II.40)" (Elster 1998b, 1)
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The notion that a citizen who does not discuss politics is “useless” is a far cry from the
modern self-adulation heard in claims of those who proudly take no part in politics. The
quotation demonstrates that deliberation was important for the ancient Greeks.
Jon Elster also notes that one of the more famous quotations in deliberative
democratic theory predates the formation of the first modern democratic state. In 1774,
Edmund Burke, while speaking in opposition to binding mandates which would require
elected officials to adhere to promises made while campaigning or to demands of the
citizenry at the time of election, offered an argument based on the importance of
deliberation.

"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment;
and he betrays instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. . .
. Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate,
against other agents and advocates, but parliament is a deliberative
assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not
local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good,
resulting from the general reason of the whole." (Edmund Burke, as quote
in Elster 1998b, 3)

According to Burke, representatives are expected to deliberate and deliberation is
required for the strongest advocacy.
Another traditional defense of deliberation comes from the work of John Stuart
Mill’s opposition to prior restraint and defense of freedom of speech. For Mill, one reason
that a democracy ought to guarantee freedom of speech is so that the government does
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not stray far from what informed citizens believe to be reasonable. Indeed, it is a sign that
the people are the genuine authors of laws if they refrain from revolt even while free and
informed. This is not to say that citizens reason well, just that they do at least reason
about their own interests and will not tolerate large deviations from apparently reasonable
policy. For Mill, a more informed populace grants more legitimacy to a democracy.
Discussion is a safeguard against both tyranny and human fallibility. (Elster 1998b; Mill
1859)
Other defenders of the notion that democracy implies deliberation include
Roberto Gargarella and Gerry Mackie. Gargarella argues that deliberation was one of two
components in a model of democracy held by the US founding fathers and their British
counterparts, the other component being full representation. Though their concern was
not with impartiality but with balancing ambition against ambition, the combination of
full representation and deliberation is also a catalyst to impartial decisions. (Gargarella
1998) Mackie utilizes the claim that democracy inherently includes both voting and
deliberation to protect democracy from criticisms of voting as inaccurate and
manipulable. Because democracy includes both voting and deliberation, arguments that
detract from voting’s virtues do not equally impune democracy. (Mackie 1998)
On the other hand, perhaps deliberation is indeed a new direction for democratic
theory. The field of deliberative democracy did not emerge until the 1980’s. In some
regard, the development of deliberative democratic theory certainly seems to be a
response to various shortcomings of democratic theory. Lynn M. Sanders goes so far as to
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argue that deliberation is at odds with democracy and that deliberative democracy is
incompatible with aspects of liberalism. This is due to liberalism’s adamance that it has
identified universalizable principles such as human rights that are beyond consideration
in deliberation. Liberalism allegedly attempts to remove them from the valid topics of
deliberation. Another potential incompatibility stems from deliberation’s emphasis on the
use of dispassionate, impartial, rational discourse which may foreclose certain positions
and arguments, thus resulting in inequality in the deliberative arena. (Sanders 1997) If
deliberation is not inherent in democracy, then that would help explain how deliberative
theory could arrive at undemocratic conclusions. It would not be an extension of
democracy, but a patchwork of corrections with unintended consequences.
I am persuaded that deliberation has always been relevant to democracy, but that
the growth in interest in deliberative democracy over the past few decades is an attempt
to address a growing tension between power and equality. According to Rosenberg,
aggregative conceptions of democracy include a potential conflict between individual
preferences and a public good. Deliberative democracy is a response to this conflict.
“Deliberative democracy subjects power to the discipline of talk and to the reasoning of
equal persons.” (Rosenberg 2007a, 20) Power can be distributed more evenly while
maintaining social unity and stability if consensus is increased. Deliberation is appealing
for its potential to generate consensus and meta-consensus, which in turn will allow a
more egalitarian distribution of political power and a more authentic democracy. Again, it
is appealing to think about deliberation as aiming at collective consciousness. Habermas
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appears to concur, writings that “[t]he sole substantial aim of the project [of constitutional
democracy] is the gradual improvement of institutionalized procedures of rational
collective will-formation,” (Habermas 1997, 61)
A second important dispute is whether or not deliberation is a method of decision
making. Theorists of deliberative democracy commonly assume that deliberation is a
decision making method. They end up comparing deliberation to aggregative methods
such as voting. However, James Johnson argues that a majority of deliberative democratic
theory fails to honestly treat deliberation as a method of decision making. In doing so,
theorists avoid a fair comparison to aggregation as a method. (Johnson 1998) And Robert
E. Goodin argues that deliberation is not itself a decision making method as, unless
participants arrive at complete consensus, a decision method must follow after
deliberation. (Goodin 2000) Deliberation is not a method of decision making, but it
certainly has an effect on the decisions reached.
A third ongoing dispute is whether deliberation can occur within an individual or
if it requires multiple people. Both answers are capable of being internally consistent.
While a definition of deliberation that includes processes internal to a single mind is
broader and lends more complexity to discussions of deliberation generally, it does not in
any way preclude exploration of the benefits of deliberation between individuals. It
seems common for deliberative democracy theorists to assume that deliberation requires
multiple people, Goodin opposes that assumption and argues that some crucial aspects of
deliberation, even when occurring between individuals, takes place within the mind of
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individuals. (Goodin 2000) By emphasizing the reciprocity that must occur in the mind of
a faithful deliberator, Goodin demonstrates the importance of processes internal to
individuals for the deliberation.
A fourth, and quite lively dispute, regards the standard of reasonable pluralism
that deliberation is capable of. In other words, what can deliberation legitimately
exclude? Are there some topics which are not up for consideration in deliberation? Some
decisions that may not be reviewed? Some behaviors that are impermissible in
deliberation? Are there some worldviews that are not permissible in a deliberative arena?
Are differences in fundamental worldviews amenable to reason, and if not, are
worldviews not a useful topic of deliberation? Does deliberation inherently disallow
religious convictions not founded on evidence and arguments available to all persons? In
general, theorists supportive of deliberative democracy argue that deliberation is pluralist
in nature, that it welcomes a large diversity of topics and positions. Those who
acknowledge the limitations imposed by deliberation attempt to justify the exclusions.
Mansbridge’s points mentioned above are significant here. Because deliberation is
concerned with evaluating reasons, it is inherently open to the idea that there can be
multiple valid and conflicting arguments. (Mansbridge 2007) Another reason to think that
deliberation is pluralist in nature depends on the assumption (that will be discussed more
later) that deliberation aims at meta-consensus, which is a kind of agreement on the set of
relevant factors to consider in making a particular decision. When participants respect
each other and engage in reciprocity, they will admit the relevance and legitimacy of each
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other’s arguments even while those arguments conflict. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007)
This is akin to the Rawlsian idea of public reason. Various factors combine to produce
standards of reason that one ought to adhere to when discussing matters of public
concern, in public space. Especially important is that the reasons given be ones
acceptable to others. (Rawls 1997)
In the face of criticisms that deliberation would disregard religious convictions as
illegitimate, Cohen offers an argument that because religious people genuinely regard
their religious beliefs as fundamental, unchangeable values their fellow deliberators must,
in the interest of equality, treat those beliefs as fundamental convictions, not as choices
previously made. Without reasons to reject religious convictions that are convincing to
the religious, deliberation must respect religious liberty as an instance of reasonable
pluralism. The priority of inclusivity necessitates the acceptance of different fundamental
world views. Reasonable people can disagree on worldviews. This does not imply moral
relativism. Rather, there can be a moral truth that is beyond human capacities of reason.
While differences in fundamental worldviews persist, people may still come to political
agreement. For instance, people arrive at the notion of equality through different routes,
some religious, some secular. (Cohen 1998)
Just because deliberation welcomes incompatible worldviews does not mean that
they are beyond challenge. James Johnson argues that deliberation necessarily includes
challenges, not just to values, interests, and preferences, but also to fundamental
worldviews. And even though worldviews may be challenged, there is no guarantee that
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disputes over them will be amenable to reason. Fundamental worldviews may be
inherently unamenable to reason or they may merely be beyond human reasoning
capacities. Either possibility is sufficient to render some worldview differences incapable
of resolution through deliberation. Some amount of disagreement is endemic to political
discussion and not all differences are theoretically resolvable. (Johnson 1998). Joshua
Cohen agrees and points out that deliberation need not be capable of resolving
fundamental moral differences in order to increase political consensus as people can
arrive at a similar policy preference from different fundamental assumptions. (Cohen
1998)
Deliberative democrats do defend some restrictions on permissible arguments
during deliberation, namely those that are either unreasonable or explicitly opposed to
deliberation. Cass R. Sunstein argues that excluding certain unreasonable arguments from
deliberation is both acceptable and coherent. Though doing so requires a pre-deliberation
conception of reasonable arguments, this does not require a preconceived notion of the
correct answer, which would be quite a problematic feature of a deliberative theory. As
Sunstein argues, it is possible to know which views count as reasonable without knowing
the right decision. Deliberation has no commitment to allowing every view a platform.
Rather deliberation ought to facilitate critical evaluation of reasonable, competing
arguments. (Sunstein 1999) Included in the category of unreasonable arguments are those
that explicitly oppose deliberation. All worldviews must be welcomed except stances
against deliberation which are irrelevant as they cannot be held in deliberation. (Cohen
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1998) It would seem then that on topics like the permissibility of slavery, deliberation
ought to permit discussion of the possibility but it would emerge that permitting slavery
violates the preconditions for deliberation, and thus could be labeled an unreasonable
position.
Another question regarding reasonable pluralism is whether deliberation is free
from alternative communication styles that include greeting, rhetoric, storytelling, and
displays of passion and emotion. Many theorists reject these limitations and argue that
deliberation permits emotion, though some measures of deliberation do give lower scores
for certain displays of passion. (Mansbridge 2007) Though clear reasoning is often
dispassionate, passion has many potential benefits, such as fostering endurance of a
deliberative process. Extreme dispassion can raise suspicion and engender distrust.
(Gambetta 1998) In general, critics of deliberative democratic theories are generally not
opposed to deliberation per se, but are opposed to narrowly cognitivist or rationalist
understanding of communicative influence. (Warren 2007; Young 2001) Johnson notes
that such a restriction would equally forbid displays of anger and joy from a deliberative
arena. Restricting displays of passion and emotion from deliberative arenas is a form of
“conceptual gerrymandering” that benefits those practiced in dispassionate articulation.
Civil disobedience is capable of contributing to a deliberative process when the
disobedient group is not yet allowed to fully participate or is restricted from offering
impassioned appeals. (Johnson 1998, 166)
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Dispassionate argument may be the ideal among participants with ideal
deliberative capacities. However, in the real world, capacities for purely objective
deliberation vary widely. Equality and inclusiveness, two preconditions for deliberation,
are best served by allowing displays of passion, humor, rhetoric, and storytelling. The
goal of ensuring that all participants are heard and understood dictates that deliberation
must allow utterances that are not perfectly rational arguments stated from a position of
objectivity.
This review of some defenses of deliberation’s pluralist nature should not be taken
to imply that there are no criticisms of these arguments, only that they come from outside
of deliberative democratic theory. There are indeed critics who contend the opposite, that
deliberative democracy entails unjustifiable exclusions and is overly idealistic in its
aspirations to settle disputes between fundamental viewpoints. I make no claim to have
fully investigated this topic and as such my stance on it is a mere assumption based on
my limited knowledge of the debate and my own intuition. On the question of reasonable
pluralism, it will be assumed that deliberation can legitimately reject arguments that are
not plausibly reasonable as well as reject stances that are anti-deliberation. Arguments for
or against a proposition should be those that others can accept as valid reasons, even if
they do not arrive at the same conclusion. (Cohen 2007) However, the process of
deliberation always remains up for debate and evaluation as long as that evaluation is
consistent with deliberative ideals. I assume that deliberation welcomes rather than
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restricts emotion and passion, though this is not to say that emotion and passion always
contribute positively to a deliberation.
A fifth dispute is about whether authentic deliberation ever actually occurs. Put
differently, the question is whether political behavior in a deliberative arena is
fundamentally different from the behavior of a rational actor in a market setting.
Deliberative theorists generally agree that the political process ought to be more than
self-interested competition, but whether deliberation can induce such political behavior is
debatable. (Bohman and Rehg 1997b) If not, then deliberation may merely be a cover for
other forms of influence. Indeed, a common criticism of deliberative democracy is that
authentic deliberation never actually occurs. Discussion occurs, but it is dominated by
self-interest and coercion, not mutual understanding and a common goal. (Przeworski
1998; Shapiro 1999) And critics of deliberation frequently blur the boundary between
deliberation and discussion, and then argue that mere discussion is as likely to coerce as it
is to welcome egalitarian reasoning. One such critic is Adam Przeworski who does not
agree that deliberation can induce legitimacy. Przeworski argues that “deliberation may
lead people to hold beliefs that are not in their best interest." (Przeworski 1998, 141) He
makes a compelling argument about people’s voting behavior being influenced by
equilibrium beliefs, i.e. beliefs about the beliefs of others, which are easy to manipulate
and impossible to test for truth. Due to processes that affect opinion, e.g. issue framing,
equilibrium beliefs are endogenous to politics. By affecting equilibrium beliefs,
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"[d]eliberation coordinates beliefs and locks individuals into equilibria." (Przeworski
1998, 155)
Ian Shapiro argues that authentic deliberation does not occur as people remain
self-interested and as special interests are easily able to derail public discussion of moral
issues. (Shapiro 1999) Rousseau had a similar conception of democracy in which public
discussion would be detrimental as it would use rhetoric and sophistry to distract people
from their true interests.
In general, theorists of deliberative democracy acknowledge the possible truth of
these criticisms but argue that deliberation which includes restrictions such that legitimate
arguments must aim at a common good and be potentially reasonable to all participants is
still valuable even if participants remain solely self-interested. Jon Elster makes a variety
of interesting points on this topic. While justice is a goal of political systems, unfettered
pursuit of self-interest is unlikely to produce justice. A deliberative forum is an attempted
correction and this demonstrates, at least in theory, that the principles of the market differ
from those of the forum. (Elster 1997) Simply framing an interaction as deliberation can
affect the results. In a deliberative setting, self-interest must be both disguised and
modified. (Elster 1998b) The "civilizing force of hypocrisy" forces even self-interested
speakers to argue in terms of the public interest. (Fearon, as quoted by Elster 1998b, 12)
Elster admits that it is possible to co-opt the process and use it as a cover for self-interest
or for group-interests of the powerful. An emphasis on logical and articulate speaking can
allow sophistry to dominate and perpetuate the interests of the powerful despite an
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ostensibly impartial process. Speakers in ancient Athens would sometimes "stress their
own artlessness and the slickness of their opponents." (Elster 1998b, 2) Behavior of that
sort gives an advantage to simple arguments over complex ones and is a manifestation of
the deliberative principles of inclusion and equality that arguments are directed to the
understanding of the listeners. (Elster 1997)
Jane Mansbridge argues that exploration of self-interest and bargaining are
legitimate actions in authentic deliberation. Bargaining is legitimate because it helps
reveal and clarify individual interests. Exploration of self-interest is justified because
participants are expected to default to favoring their own interests when they can neither
act towards a common good or vote for the outcome of fair bargaining. Self-interest is the
third tier of a citizen’s duty. (Mansbridge 2007) This conflicts with many theorists who
think of bargaining as distinct from deliberation, notably Jon Elster who argues that the
two are opposite ends of a spectrum. (Elster 1998b)
Related to the question of the occurrence of authentic deliberation is a question of
capacity for deliberation. Assuming that authentic deliberation is both possible and
distinct from self-interested, market-style behavior raises the question of whether people
have an innate capacity for deliberation or if the skills of deliberation must be learned.
The continental European tradition exemplified by Habermas holds that while reason is
the same for all cultures, capacities for deliberation vary between cultures and over time.
The capacity to reason is historically and culturally relative. Autonomy and
self-reflection are not universal capacities but specific sociocultural achievements. The
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surrounding communication structures shape individual cognitive capacities. For all these
reasons, deliberation requires more than the absence of power and outside influence, it
requires the active fostering of deliberative capacities. (Rosenberg 2007a)
This thesis is not going to resolve the dispute over whether authentic deliberation
ever occurs. Herein it will be assumed that some form of deliberation approximating
Habermas’s concept of “communicative action”, in which participants aim at a mutual
understanding and reciprocity, is at times possible between individuals. (Habermas 1984)
While Przeworski’s concerns are valid, i.e. discussion may indeed induce people to hold
preferences for worse outputs, this occurs more frequently where the quality of
deliberation is poor. Przeworski’s concerns speak to the importance of being able to
distinguish between good deliberation, that probabilistically tends to facilitate successful
action towards a common good, and bad deliberation, that contributes to worse outputs
and outcomes, often as Przeworski suggests due to manipulation. Given the assumption
that better and worse forms of deliberation are possible, identifying and fostering good
deliberation is our strongest safeguard against discussions that produce worse outputs and
outcomes.
A sixth ongoing dispute is whether deliberation is epistemic in nature. That is,
does deliberation result in knowledge? There are two types of knowledge that
deliberation might provide: knowledge of correct/best/better policies and knowledge of
the public will. A subquestion, related to the first way in which deliberation may be
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epistemic, is whether objectively best or correct outputs exist prior to deliberation.
Theorists disagree on these points.
Many theorists defend deliberation’s epistemic potential for optimal outputs and
outcomes. Mark E. Warren writes, “The key claim of deliberative theories of democracy
is simple and compelling: deliberative approaches to collective decisions under
conditions of conflict produce better decisions than those resulting from alternative
means of conducting politics: coercion, traditional deference, or markets.” (Warren 2007,
272) Bohman agrees, writing that "the best defense of public deliberation is that it is
more likely to improve the epistemic quality of justifications for political decisions."
(Bohman and Rehg 1997b, 27) David Estlund argues for a middle ground between
epistemic based and fairness based defenses of deliberation. He terms this middle ground
epistemic proceduralism. He argues that deliberation probabilistically tends to produce
epistemically superior outputs. Once the exercise of reason is included in a process, then
the outcomes must be more reasonable by a standard independent of the deliberative
process. Thus, they have epistemic weight, not mere procedural weight. However, there is
no certainty that an output of deliberation is superior, and thus while citizens ought to
obey a decision produced by deliberation, they are not required to agree with the decision
and believe that their own personal judgment is mistaken. (Estlund 1997)
Cass R. Sunstein raises considerable objections to the epistemic nature of
deliberation. He demonstrates that when discussion occurs within a relatively
homogeneous group, the result is an increase in extremism and polarization of the
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members relative to non-members. This raises serious questions about whether
deliberation can actually produce better, more correct, outcomes than other methods.
(Sunstein 1999)
The second sense in which deliberation may be epistemic is that it provides
knowledge of a public will. Niemeyer and Dryzek reject the claim that deliberation
produces right decisions by an objective standard.

There is no correct decision

independent of the particular participants. However, it does produce superior, rational
outcomes when it abides by the meta-consensus of which factors to consider. In doing so,
“deliberation should produce outcomes that reflect the will of its participants." (Niemeyer
and Dryzek 2007, 506) A related effect of deliberation is the production of intersubjective
rationality, i.e. consistency of alignment of beliefs with preferences across individuals. In
other words, those who agree on a course of action also agree on the relevant reasons
while those who disagree on a course of action also disagree on the relevant reasons.
"Deliberation should, then, improve the standardization of what should be done in light of
any particular individual subjective standpoint." (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 507)
Deliberation facilitates a rational link between values and beliefs on the one hand and
preferences on the other.
Christian List makes the case that deliberation improves the epistemic quality of
majoritarian voting methods. Deliberation fosters meta-agreement through a process of
structuration in which preferences come to be aligned along a single dimension in a
single-peaked fashion. A meta-agreement on the relevant factors and that has a
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single-peaked distribution of preferences increases the probability of deriving meaningful
measures of the public will from majoritarian voting methods. (List 2007)
On the question of deliberation’s epistemic nature, again I am not qualified to
adjudicate. It will be assumed that deliberation is probabilistically likely to produce
objectively superior outputs and outcomes compared to decision making absent
deliberation. However, those superior outputs were not objectively determined in
advance. Rather they are at least partially determined by the deliberative process. That is,
deliberation helps both to discover and shape epistemically superior outputs. This is
because there is an information feedback mechanism wherein the process of deliberation
reveals, articulates, and transforms preferences. The resulting superior outputs were not
objectively knowable prior to deliberation. Deliberation engages a process of
simultaneous discovery and creation of superior outputs and outcomes.
A seventh important question in deliberative democratic theory is how to justify
deliberation’s central position in democracy. A strong and frequently offered justification
of deliberation is its capacity to produce epistemically superior decisions and outcomes.
Other possible benefits are frequently noted, but few theorists argue that deliberation
could be justified without epistemological benefits.
Jon Elster argues that political institutions, such as a practice of deliberation, are
justified only when market behavior, pursuit of self-interest, would result in worse
outcomes for everyone. (Elster 1997) A justification to engage principles of a forum, as
opposed to those of the market, can only be justified based on the outcomes. For Elster, it
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is incoherent that the primary benefit of a decision making process would be, not the
decision, but the side effects of the process. It is equally incoherent to judge a painting by
the lessons the painter learned while painting it. Positive by-products are welcome, and
worthy of discussion, but cannot be the primary justification of deliberation. (Elster 1997)
Niemeyer argues in a similar vein that the primary goal of a deliberative system must be
to produce the best outcomes and that if this is not achieved no amount of second-order
goals can justify deliberation. (Niemeyer 2014)
Many theorists note both the epistemic benefits as well as other benefits without
taking a firm stance that only epistemic benefits can justify deliberation. For Habermas,
legitimacy of deliberative democratic decisions is tied to the outcomes but also the fact
that the outcomes deliberation does produce are theoretically endorsable by everyone and
practically closer to consensus than other methods. (Fabienne 2017) Nimeyer and Dryzek
argue that deliberation produces legitimacy by increasing meta-consensus and
intersubjective rationality. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007) As more people come to agree
on a shared overton-window of plausibly reasonable positions and enacted policy falls
within that window, it is likely that more people will view that policy as potentially
legitimate. James D. Fearon notes a short list of potential benefits discussion may have on
political decisions. He includes various benefits to the outputs and outcomes of
deliberation, the production of legitimacy as well as perceived legitimacy, and its
beneficial effects on the intellectual and moral capacities of the participants. (Fearon
1998)
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Joshua Cohen defends even imperfect, real world deliberation, arguing that it is
still valuable for producing legitimacy, superior outcomes, and byproducts. Two
especially important byproducts are the transformation of preferences and the
improvement of the capacities of the participants. (Cohen 1997) Diego Gambetta argues
that deliberation may foster creativity and courage in the face of situations without
obvious solutions. This can have benefits on the outcomes as well as on the participants.
Gambetta also argues that deliberation may transfer principles of behavior from the
deliberative arena into public life, principles such as equality and inclusion and which
will tend to improve distributive justice, i.e. pareto-superior distributions. (Gambetta
1998)
Interestingly, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that democracy, despite often
producing worse outcomes than aristocracy, is justified for the beneficial way in which it
invigorates the populace. (Elster 1997) Another relatively unique position is held by
Maeve Cooke. She rejects defenses of deliberative democracy based on the epistemic
quality of its outcomes as well as defenses based on the beneficial effects on the citizenry.
The one argument that she accepts as valid is that deliberative democracy aligns with
who we are. (Cooke 2000)
An eighth dispute, and one that is especially important for this thesis, regards the
effects that deliberation is capable of having on preferences. At the heart of deliberative
democracy is the theory and hope that preferences can be changed, not just aggregated.
(Elster, as cited in List 2007) John Dryzek says so explicitly when he writes, the
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“defining feature of deliberative democracy is that individuals participating in democratic
processes are amenable to changing their minds and their preferences as a result of the
reflection induced by deliberation.” (Dryzek, as quoted in Cohen 2007, 221) Indeed, if
individuals' opinions and preferences are not capable of changing as a result of reflection
then deliberative democracy is impossible. (Cohen 2007) Without the possibility of
preference transformation, deliberation is meaningless as it would merely be a cover for
censorship and paternalism. (Elster 1997)
Some argue that deliberation is capable of revealing one’s own underlying
preferences to oneself. Joshua Cohen pushes back against this idea. Cohen discards the
notion that underlying preferences exist, or can be identified if they do exist. Rather,
preferences are always shaped by conditions. The relevant preferences and arguments are
those that can be expressed in free, open deliberation, not in advance of it. Thus,
deliberation allows the formation of identifiable preferences. (Cohen 1997)
Deliberation may also change opinions that are already formed. Frequent
presentation of arguments and opinions in terms of a common good may result in shifts
of opinion to align with the common good. Jon Elster writes, “the conceptual
impossibility of expressing selfish arguments in a debate about the public good, and the
psychological difficulty of expressing other-regarding preferences without ultimately
coming to acquire them, jointly bring it about that public discussion tends to promote the
common good.” (Elster 1997, 12)
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While theorists of deliberative democracy agree that deliberation is capable of
shaping preference, there is much more debate about whether deliberation fosters
consensus. To be sure, the ideal of perfect consensus is a bridge too far. And it is likely
that there are some differences that cannot be resolved via deliberation such as
differences in fundamental preferences, if there are such things. Gambetta is one theorist
who believes in deliberation’s potential to increase consensus. (Gambetta 1998)
Mendelberg and Karpowitz make a more specific claim, that deliberation should tend to
increase willingness to transfer income from the wealthy to the poor such that every
person can live with decency according to the standards of the time and place.
(Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007)
When consensus on a specific decision cannot be achieved there is still potential
for a meta-consensus or meta-agreement. A meta-consensus would occur when all
participants recognized the same set of factors as relevant for making an optimal decision
even though they disagree on precisely how to weigh and combine those factors. This
implies that all participants would view each other’s concerns as valid and arguments
related to them at least potentially reasonable. Niemeyer and Dryzek argue that ideal
deliberation should produce meta-consensus, i.e. agreement about the nature of the issue
at hand and the relevant factors for consideration. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007)
Christian List distinguishes between substantive agreements and meta-agreement.
His definition of meta-agreement allows for testing and falsification. Meta agreement is
when all individual preferences can be rationalized as single peaked preferences on a
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single dimension. I.e. their preferences can all be mapped on the same axis and all have a
single peak. "Two or more individuals are in meta agreement to the extent that they agree
on a common issue dimension in terms of which a given decision problem is to be
conceptualized -and in terms of which preferences are to be rationalized." (List 2007, 68)
Notably, when this type of meta-agreement occurs, the indeterminacy problem of
aggregative voting disappears. (List 2007)
On the other hand, deliberation has potential to discourage or reduce consensus.
For instance, James D. Fearon offers the example of a deliberation in which an initially
widespread but shallow agreement is replaced by a wide diversity of nuanced opinions.
(Fearon 1998)
Cass R. Sunstein provides evidence that deliberation’s consensus producing
tendency can result in polarization of a society at large when the deliberation occurs
primarily between relatively like minded individuals. He argues that intragroup
deliberation increases extremism. Deliberation by a relatively homogeneous group
increases the extremity or zealotry of their positions. Like-minded individuals who
discuss among themselves will shift their opinions farther to the extreme. Meanwhile
another group with different opinions from the first group, but all similar to each other,
will move towards extreme opinions in the opposite direction of the first group. This is
group polarization. Like-minded individuals tend to extremism when they discuss only
among themselves. Sunstein describes a process of social cascades due to reputational
consequences of taking certain positions. (Sunstein 1999)
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But Sunstein also makes a point in favor of deliberation’s potential to foster
widespread consensus. "Depolarization, rather than polarization, will also be found when
the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two extremes" (Sunstein
1999, 16) Further, "it is reasonable to speculate that polarization is most likely to occur,
and to be most extreme, under circumstances in which group membership is made salient
and people have a high degree of anonymity." (Sunstein 1999, 17) Sunstein notes that
group polarization is entirely rational for the individuals but is problematic from a larger
perspective because it may result in factual, moral, or legal mistakes. (Sunstein 1999)
As far as whether deliberation tends towards consensus and/or meta-consensus,
Niemeyer and Dryzek attempt to establish empirically that this does at least sometimes
occur. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007) It will be assumed herein that deliberation is
potentially transformative of preferences, even underlying preferences. It will also be
assumed that deliberation is more likely than not to increase consensus and
meta-consensus, and that this likelihood increases with the quality of deliberation, though
these outcomes are by no means guaranteed.

1.6 - Good Deliberation

Now that we have a definition of deliberation we can begin to distinguish between
high quality, authentic, genuine, deliberation and low quality deliberation. There are a
number of generalized values which ought to be present in good deliberation. All else
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being equal, a great degree of adherence to one of these values indicates a higher quality
deliberative process.
Good deliberation requires an orientation towards identifying, pursuing, and
generating consensus around a common good (Cohen 1997; Fishkin 2014; Fung 2007;
Rosenberg 2007a). The more that it aims at these goals, the higher the quality of the
deliberation. This is not to say that an objective common good exists. Rather, in good
deliberation the participants exhibit a reciprocal concern for each other’s interests, and
perhaps even for the interests of non-participants. Deliberation’s quest for a common
good is really a quest for consensus constrained by conditions of reciprocity.
But the emphasis on a common good comes with at least one important caveat.
Although deliberators may justly hope to identify a common good, Mansbridge points out
that identifying a common good ought not be the primary focus of deliberation. She
writes,

“a singular focus on the common good makes it harder to recognize that
deliberation may legitimately conclude correctly that the interests of the
participants are fundamentally in conflict... The conscious or unconscious
pressure to frame one's argument in terms of the common good can
seriously distort participants' understandings of the issue, making it far
harder to resolve it through legitimate bargaining (e.g., taking turns or
equalizing outcomes with sidepayments). … A legitimate deliberation
should therefore meet the criterion of helping citizens understand their
interests better, whether or not these interests can be forged into a larger
common good.” (Mansbridge 1999, 226)
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While aiming at a common good is a laudable practice and stems from the value of
reciprocity, we ought not forget that identifying such a common good is not the primary
function of deliberation, which ought to be to accurately clarify conflict and potential
resolutions.
Rosenberg offers some clarity on quality of deliberation with a hierarchical
typology of discourse based on the subject matter being discussed. He divides discourse
into four types or levels. The higher quality forms of discourse are more frequently
employed when lower levels have been unsuccessful. Rosenberg’s lowest tier of
discourse is proto discourse, which is not deliberative at all. Proto discourse includes
everyday conversations that are not oriented towards a discussion of a common good or
consensus. It includes greetings, small talk, and perhaps threats and bargaining.
Rosenberg’s second tier of discourse, conventional discourse, is potentially deliberative.
Conventional discourse focuses on deciding what to do in a given situation. It is aimed at
making a decision but does not necessarily exhibit other principles of deliberation.
Discourse at this level includes bargaining, which is not deliberative, but can also include
deliberation among individuals who already share a conception of the problem to be
addressed, the decision to be made, and the legitimate methods of discussion that may be
employed. For instance, a family deciding where to go to dinner might engage in
conventional discourse. When participants do not share an understanding of a problem, or
they recognize that their shared understanding is faulty, then they are likely to engage in
the next tier of discourse: cooperative discourse. In cooperative discourse, participants
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aim to arrive at an accurate and shared understanding of a problem. A simple example of
this type of discourse is a discussion between car mechanics as to the cause of an
anomaly in a car’s functioning. A more complex example might be a discussion between
a fiscal conservative and a fiscal progressive as to the cause of poverty. They are unlikely
to come to an agreement on a solution while they conceive of the problem differently.
Rosenberg’s highest tier of discourse is collaborative discourse. In collaborative
discourse, attention is paid to the quality of the discourse itself as well as to social
arrangements that might otherwise be assumed to be immutable. This tier includes meta
discussion of the discourse itself. Allegations of bias in the very method of discussion are
an example of collaborative discourse. Also included is discussion of the health of the
deliberative community and questioning of long-standing social relations. Collaborative
discourse has the potential to transform or reconstruct social relations and meanings.
Collaborative discourse is, in a word, meta-discourse. It is concerned with factors that
might influence and bias the discourse itself. (Rosenberg 2007b)
Rosenberg’s typology of discourse is quite useful. It seems accurate that
Rosenberg’s higher tiers of discourse are less common but of higher quality as they are
open to more perspectives. However, I believe a caveat should be made that discourse on
a higher tier is not always desirable. It does not necessarily indicate poor quality
deliberation if discourse remains at a lower tier. If discourse need not escalate up the tiers
because there is already general agreement, then it is not a shortcoming to remain in the
lower tiers of discourse. However, if discourse lacks general agreement on the nature of a
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problem or the social relations that structure discourse, yet does not escalate up through
Rosenberg’s tiers, presumably because such discussion is foreclosed by power relations,
then that is indeed a shortcoming of that deliberative process. Thus, groups that do
achieve collaborative discourse demonstrate an advanced deliberative capacity, but
groups that do not escalate up the tiers of discourse are not necessarily lacking in such
capacity.
Many other markers of quality of deliberation come from visible aspects of the
process, as opposed to the tier of subject matter. Rosenberg was writing about discourse,
which is similar, but not identical, to deliberation. Discourse may rise to the tier of
collaborative discourse but

still remain constrained, haphazard, heated, and

self-interested. Deliberation, however, is not mere discussion. High quality deliberation is
characterized by an attitude of open-mindedness, conscientiousness, and sincerity.
Participants refrain from overtly self-interested conduct. (Estlund 1997; Fishkin 2014;
Rosenberg 2007a; Weatherford and McDonnell 2007) This is not to say that acting out of
self-interest is not warranted. Merely that deliberation assumes a level of reciprocity
which forecloses a disregard for the interests of others.
Another crucial deliberative value is freedom. Participants should be autonomous
individuals, free from coercion, able to speak and disagree without fear of severe
consequences. (Cohen 1997; Elster 1998a; Rosenberg 2007a) Again, we have an
interesting caveat as a result of a deliberative value. Although deliberation aims at
consensus, and there may be good reason to interpret an increase in consensus as a
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positive effect of deliberation, we must be wary of false consensus that appears due to
coercion and power. Jon Elster thus points out that falling short of consensus may
actually indicate a healthier deliberative process than one that results in consensus.
Afterall, perfect consensus is quite unlikely in important, compex matters. A society in
which many citizens disagree with the status quo or the majority opinion is one in which
those individuals have the freedom and autonomy to do so. (Elster 1997) Not only is it
invalid to assume a direct correlation between consensus and quality of deliberation, the
level of disagreement is potentially indicative of a healthy deliberative process in which
participants are willing to openly disagree.
Closely tied to the idea of free individuals is the value of equality. With regard to
the relations between participants, high quality deliberation is egalitarian, respectful, and
reciprocal. (Cohen 1997; Fishkin 2014; Fung 2007; Rosenberg 2007a; Weatherford and
McDonnell 2007) One consequence of applying these values is that arguments are
considered without regard to their source. It ought to make no difference which person
introduced a proposition when evaluating that proposition. But equality in deliberation
does not imply treating all interests as equally valid or as warranting equal weight in a
final decision. Joshua Cohen points out that equality in deliberation is achieved by
treating all arguments, not interests, equally. Equality requires that justifications be
presented in the form of arguments which could, at least theoretically, be accepted by all
as valid reasons. (Cohen 1998)
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Equality is not achieved when some are excluded. Thus the values of inclusivity
and diversity are also beneficial for deliberation. (Cohen 1997; Estlund 1997; Fishkin
2014; Fung 2007; Weatherford and McDonnell 2007) Ideal deliberation is broadly
accepting of almost all people and perspectives, with the only exception being
worldviews that contradict the preconditions and values of deliberation. Arguments that
participants should be excluded or coerced are unacceptable in high quality deliberation.
High quality deliberation is also both rational and reasonable. It is rational for
participants to engage as it benefits both their interests and group interests. And
deliberation is reasonable in the sense that it attempts to apply reason to assessment of
decision options. Among other things, this implies that responses during deliberation are
related to proposals via reason. That is, the points that participants make are not non
sequiturs. In addition, the use of reason implies a point mentioned earlier, that proposals
ought to be evaluated without regard to their source. (Cohen 1997; Estlund 1997; Fishkin
2014; Fung 2007; Rosenberg 2007a)
A few other traits of good deliberation are worth mentioning. Good deliberation
generates legitimacy in the eyes of the participants. Participants agree that a solution
arrived at via deliberation deserves compliance. (Cohen 1997; Rosenberg 2007a) Also,
information is of crucial importance for deliberation. Participants need access to relevant,
accurate information as well as knowledge of the views of the other participants. (Estlund
1997; Fishkin 2014) A couple fairly obvious prerequisites for deliberation are the health
and safety of the participants. Open, rational deliberation is far more difficult or

46

MCCORMICK

impossible when participants are stressed by their desires for short term survival.
(Estlund 1997) Finally, deliberation requires time. There must be a suspension of decision
and action such that deliberation has the potential to inform a decision. (Rosenberg
2007a)
Compared to the relatively uncontested, aforementioned generalized values and
traits of high quality deliberation, it is far more difficult to specify the relationship
between efficiency and good deliberation. This begs the question of whether a measure of
the timeliness of a deliberative process can be incorporated into a measure of its quality. I
argue herein that good deliberation is inherently inefficient, and thus that efficiency ought
not be used as a measure of the quality of deliberation. Generally speaking, and all else
being equal, a shorter process is superior. However, it is unlikely that deliberation that
takes less time can be equal to deliberation that takes longer. Deliberation is a methodical
process that ought not be rushed. While a shorter decision making process is often
desirable, especially when possible outcomes decline rapidly over time (Gambetta 1998),
this does not mean that brief deliberation is superior. Rather, in such situations, good
deliberation is not likely to produce better outcomes because good deliberation takes
time. Mark E. Warren acknowledges this and argues that, in such situations, we ought to
balance our use of deliberation against other activities in order to achieve superior
outcomes. As decision making mechanisms, markets handle complexity well, but they
lack agency to respond to normative ideals. Rule-based authority is great for timely
decisions but lacks legitimacy. Deliberation can bestow normative direction, clarify
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positions, and improve capacities of citizens, but is time consuming. (Warren 2007) It is
not the task of a deliberative process to engage in time management. If a worse outcome
were to result due to spending too much time deliberating, that is not the fault of
deliberation but the fault of poor time management. Good deliberation takes time. If a
worse outcome results due to the deterioration of options during the time spent
deliberating, this is not the fault of deliberation. The worse outcome is not the product of
the deliberation.
One of the consequences of this stance on the relationship between deliberation
and efficiency is that deliberation is not an unfettered good. The quality of deliberation
ought to be measured independently of the timeliness of deliberation. People must make
decisions about how much to utilize deliberation as it comes at a cost. A state or group
that scores higher on a measure of deliberation will not necessarily produce superior
outputs. This makes it especially problematic to attempt to measure deliberation via the
quality of outputs.
The benefit of conceptually distinguishing deliberation from efficiency is that it
keeps the concept of deliberation relatively pure, preventing the need to determine ideal
efficiency in distinct situations. Although I believe this move is justified, I also recognize
the potentially problematic nature of this separation. The discussion of the validity of
separating the two concepts could itself take up a master’s thesis. I welcome other
researchers to take up this challenge. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will
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assume that the quality of deliberation is distinct from the amount of time spent
deliberating, and thus from a measure of efficiency.
A related point regards the pace of deliberation. When efficiency is not a concern,
a slow pace becomes indicative of a more thorough deliberative process, and thus of
superior deliberation. A slow pace benefits many of our other deliberative values such as
equality and inclusion. Good deliberation will explore unknown information in a
methodical manner. It will invite everyone to speak and ensure that they have been
understood by probing and facilitating their expression. It will ensure that no perspective
has been overlooked. Participants may help each other articulate their points. This is
especially important in light of the differences in language and rational debate capacities
between people, which should be irrelevant for the evaluation of arguments. Basically,
good deliberation will proceed slowly as it leans towards exploration, inclusion, and
politeness, at the cost of efficiency.
There are some noteworthy disagreements as to the conditions which foster high
quality deliberation. Questions remain about the optimal amount of heterogeneity within
deliberative groups. Cass R. Sunstein argues, and finds evidence, that participants in
deliberation within relatively homogenous groups are likely to shift their opinions
towards an extreme position in a process he calls a social cascade. On the other hand,
deliberation within relatively heterogeneous groups are likely to have a moderating effect
on the opinions of participants. (Sunstein 1999) James D. Fearon points out that the
reverse is possible. Deliberation within homogeneous groups reduces the incentive to

49

MCCORMICK

misrepresent one’s opinions and has potential to improve the quality of deliberation by
fostering sincerity and honesty. On the other hand, drastically heterogeneous groups
struggle to find sufficient common ground to deliberation and thus tend towards strategic
bargaining rather than reasoned, reciprocal argument. (Fearon 1998) Both authors are
likely onto something and empirical research may be required to resolve the relative
strength of the effects.
Another unresolved question is how publicity and privacy relate to high quality
deliberation. There are both costs and benefits to both private and public deliberation.
Theorists generally agree that at least some publicity is required for good deliberation.
(Bohman 1996; Elster 1998a; Rosenberg 2007a; Weatherford and McDonnell 2007)
Publicity of the process by which the agenda and time constraints are set is especially
important since these determine the ground rules for deliberation. However, the benefits
of private discussion, namely the freedom from reputational concerns and coercion that it
accords to individuals, are large. Deliberative processes may be of higher quality if they
include privacy in some capacity. Privacy is especially desirable when external
circumstances and pressures are strong, such as when writing a constitution. (Elster
1998a)
I turn now to the outputs and outcomes of good deliberation. While it may not be
possible to measure the rationality of decisions made following deliberation, as I stated
above in the definitions section, it will be assumed that deliberation produces outputs that
are more rational. This is a result of the use of the human capacity for reason. In addition,
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due to the intersubjective nature of deliberation, I assumed that the outputs of deliberation
will tend to be more just than outcomes that do not follow deliberation. The higher
quality a deliberative process, the more rational, mutually justifiable, and just the
outcomes are likely to be.
Apart from the decision outputs of deliberation, which are the direct goal of the
deliberation, there are other outcomes or byproducts of deliberation. These outcomes are
useful to consider for their possible application in measuring quality of deliberation via
process tracing. Many authors argue that deliberation has the capacity to improve the
citizenry and Joshua Cohen is especially clear on this point. Ideal deliberative democracy
contributes to the self-respect, political competence, and sense of justice of its citizens. It
contributes to the self-actualization of citizens and shapes their identities and interests.
(Cohen 1997) A high quality deliberative democracy may foster certain traits among its
citizens.
Jame Bohman argues that a line can be drawn between successful and
unsuccessful deliberation on the basis of whether or not cooperation follows the
deliberation. He argues that deliberation begins when a problem causes coordination to
break down. Deliberation is successful when actors once again cooperate. Success does
not imply that all agree with the outcomes, but rather that the decision reached is
acceptable and that the reasons behind are sufficient to motivate future cooperation. In
order for reasons to motivate even those who dissent from them, they must have been
produced and tested in free, rational deliberation between equal citizens. Under such
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conditions, a dissenter is more likely to cooperate and view the decision as legitimate.
(Bohman 1996)
Deliberation also has an effect on information, with the effect of good deliberation
being distinguishable from bad. I argue that deliberation should have a selection effect in
favor of truth and against misinformation, with good deliberation demonstrating this
effect more than bad deliberation. Diego Gabetta appears to agree, arguing that the
primary benefit of deliberation is the increase in distribution of information. (Gambetta
1998) I am taking this a step further by claiming that good deliberation selects for high
quality information. Thomas Christiano offers some support for this idea with a
description of how competition and sanctions between experts can filter out low quality
information even in the absence of a centralized decision. (Christiano 2012)
Finally, deliberation’s effect on consensus must be addressed. I argue, and
assume, that deliberation fosters consensus and meta-consensus (an agreement on the
relevant factors and plausible considerations regardless of agreement on a final decision),
and that high quality deliberation is more likely to do so than low quality. Theorists
support this position, though not unanimously. Niemeyer and Dryzek argue, and have
empirical evidence to support the claim, that authentic deliberation ought to produce both
meta-consensus and intersubjective rationality. They identify multiple types of
meta-consensus depending on the relevant component of deliberation, either preferences
(opinions about the best choice of what is actually to be done), values, or beliefs (about
factual states of affairs such as cause and effect relationships). "Normative consensus is
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agreement on values. Epistemic consensus is agreement on how actions affect values in
cause and effect terms. Preference consensus is agreement on what should be done. "
Each of these types of consensus has a meta version that good deliberation ought to
produce. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 502) Unfortunately, as mentioned prior, coercion
is also capable of increasing consensus, so a measurement of deliberation based on
consensus would have to disentangle the two effects.

1.7 - Deliberation Grants Legitimacy

Deliberation is the central concept of the popular and active field of deliberative
democratic theory. At the most general level, deliberative democrats share a belief that
deliberation does play, and should play, a central role in democracy. Deliberative
democrats are unsatisfied with aggregative conceptions of democracy. These conceptions
assume that individual preferences are fixed and so the task of democracy is to fairly
aggregate those preferences in order to determine a most popular course of action.
Aggregative conceptions of democracy do not allow for the transformation of individual
preferences. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, emphasize the potential for
deliberation to reveal unarticulated latent preferences, to increase the detail and
specificity of held preferences, and to result in a change of preferences upon
consideration.
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The one thing that theorists of deliberative democracy agree on is that
deliberation, in one way or another, grants legitimacy to decisions. “Broadly defined,
deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate lawmaking issues from the
public deliberation of citizens.” (Bohman and Rehg 1997a, ix) Rawls and Habermas are
generally in distinct camps of deliberative democracy, but both agree that in order for a
political choice to be legitimate it must be the product of deliberation about ends among
free, equal, and rational agents. (Elster 1998b) According to Bernard Manin and James
Bohman as well, deliberative democracy considers legitimacy to be derived from a fair
process of public deliberation. (Fabienne 2017) Diego Gambetta concurs and likens
deliberation to scientific thought in that they both acquire legitimacy from public inquiry
and justification. (Gambetta 1998) Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberation
facilitates legitimacy of collective decisions, and does so better than interest group
bargaining. (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) Jane Mansbridge notes that citizens are more
likely to trust experts on topics about which the citizen cannot judge for themselves when
those experts at least appear to be accountable to deliberation at some point than when
the experts are not accountable to deliberation. (Mansbridge et al. 2012)
A crucial and related question is whether deliberation is the only route to
legitimacy. One answer can be found in the work of Jane Mansbridge, who divides
deliberative democratic theory into two general traditions, “deliberative democracy” and
“democratic deliberation”. The “deliberative democracy” tradition holds that deliberative
democracy is the only legitimate form of democracy as reasoned deliberation on the
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common good is the only source of legitimacy. Self-interest is not a legitimate aim.
Theorists in this tradition desire that power have no effect on decisions as political
decisions ought to be made entirely on the basis of reason aimed at the common good.
They also desire consensus. This tradition is generally popular among European thinkers
and is exemplified by Jurgen Habermas. His conception of “communicative action” is
aimed at understanding and distinct from strategic action which is aimed at winning.
(Mansbridge 2007)
Bernard Manin and Joshua Cohen are also within the “deliberative democracy”
tradition. According to James D. Fearon, Bernard Manin argues that discussion is the
only way to produce politically legitimate decisions. For Manin, it is engagement with
the human capacity for reason that determines political legitimacy. The more engagement
with this capacity, the more legitimacy. (Fearon 1998) For Cohen, only deliberation
aimed at “rational consensus” can confer legitimacy to its outcomes. He writes,
“outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free
and reasoned agreement among equals.” (Cohen 1997, 73)
The other major tradition, that of “democratic deliberation”, holds that
democracies have multiple mixed sources of legitimacy, making this a pluralist
conception of democratic legitimacy. Mansbridge also refers to this tradition as
“neo-pluralist”. According to this tradition, deliberation contributes to legitimacy of laws,
but so too does fair aggregation of competing interests and factors such as adherence to
reason, inclusiveness, reciprocity, and equality. Thinkers in this tradition recognize that it
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is impossible to extricate power from public questions and that consensus on a decision
pertaining to the common good is an unachievable goal. However, they do hold out the
possibility that deliberation can foster agreement on common concerns even if no specific
policy has consensus support. The “democratic deliberation” tradition is generally
popular among American political scientists. (Mansbridge 2007)
Mansbridge defends the neo-pluralist tradition of democratic deliberation. She
argues that deliberation inherently admits of pluralism. While invocation of the concept
of reason can imply that there is a single correct decision, the phrase “giving reasons”
implies an acceptance of plurality and a multiplicity of perspectives. While reason is
important, deliberation is both an emotional and cognitive process. Emotions are
inextricably linked with cognition, and thus with reason in deliberation. We ought to
consider the role of emotion in deliberation and doing so reveals the shortcoming of
deliberation as the sole purveyor of legitimacy. (Mansbridge 2007)
Another scholar in the neo-pluralist tradition is Robert E. Goodin who reminds us
that unless deliberation produces a perfect consensus then a decision must be made by
other means. Therefore, if a decision is to have legitimacy then deliberation cannot be the
sole source of legitimacy. (Goodin 2000) In a similar vein, Stephen Weatherford and
Loraine M. McDonnell address the tension between deliberation and traditional sources
of democratic legitimacy. They argue that when deliberation is done well, its outputs have
a legitimate claim to authority, but that so too do the winners of elections and
appointments. (Weatherford and McDonnell 2007)
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If deliberation is to be the sole source of democratic legitimacy then it must be
capable of producing decisions. However, as we saw above, deliberation does not
produce decisions, and thus cannot be the only route to legitimacy. The simple fact that
deliberation is regularly incapable of making decisions necessitates that legitimacy must
be attainable from other sources, for instance, perhaps from the fairness of a procedure.
In the next chapter, I will address the conception of good deliberation at the macro
level, i.e. at the scale of a nation-state. Many of the aforementioned generalized values
and outcomes will be the same, but some may not be applicable, or may be applicable in
a different manner in macro deliberation. The next section will review the system
perspective of macro level deliberative democracy wherein a democratic state is viewed
as a kind of organ performing a distributed deliberation process. The systemic perspective
forms the basis for my recommendations for an operationalization of deliberation at the
macro level.
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Chapter 2

Deliberative Systems and their Assessment

2.1 - The Systemic Turn

The field of deliberative democracy has taken a systemic turn. The field was
previously focused on micro-level deliberation such as that that occurs in small forums.
But there was no clear route to scale up deliberation to the level of the nation-state. This
left both the normative and descriptive goals of deliberative democracy in question. Was
deliberation, as theorists had claimed, actually inherent in democracy if it cannot function
at a large scale? Is large scale deliberation even possible? Or desirable?
One interesting and early attempt to resolve this problem was made by Robert E.
Goodin. He argued to shift the locus of deliberation to within, rather than between,
individuals. "Deliberation, on this account, is less a matter of making people
‘conversationally present’ and more a matter of making them ‘imaginatively present’ in
the minds of deliberators.” (Goodin 2000) The problem of bringing all citizens into
conversation together can be avoided if citizens carry in their minds relatively accurate
representations of each other.
Ultimately however, it has been the systemic perspective that has garnered the
most attention and appears to have the most capacity to harmonize deliberative
democratic theory with the large-scale reality of nation-states. This branch of deliberative
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democracy is now sometimes referred to as deliberative democratic systems theory
(DDST). DDST is an attempt to protect the field of deliberative democracy from
challenges to its applicability. More specifically, the systemic perspective helps protect
the field from the perils of a requirement that citizen deliberation is required for quality
deliberation and legitimacy. Public deliberation in the sense of ordinary citizens
deliberating on the same topics and level of detail as experts and representatives is
impossible. Deliberative democracy is an attempt to maintain the ideal of citizens who, in
some sense, author their own laws. The systemic perspective does this without centering
citizen deliberation. One consequence of a systemic perspective is that deliberative
democracy is compatible with elitist theory that not everyone is fit to govern. A
deliberative system does not require deliberation from each citizen in order to produce
well-reasoned results. There is a division of deliberative and informational labor.
The development of DDST has not been based on novel findings, but on a desire
to overcome counter arguments to deliberative democracy. John Parkinson explicitly
acknowledges this teleological origin of DDST, writing, “The deliberative systems
approach is based on a loosening of what counts as 'reasoning together'." (Parkinson
2012, 167) And in the first chapter of the same book, all of the contributing authors
combine to produce this statement regarding their motivations:

"In what sense can we say that whole societies, demoi, peoples, or even
different communities deliberate together? A systemic approach allows us
to think productively and creatively about this question. It expands the
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scale of analysis beyond the individual site and allows us to think about
deliberations that develop among and between the sites over time."
(Mansbridge et al. 2012, 2)

In some sense, Mansbridge et al. are arguing for a different definition of deliberation
when thinking on a larger scale.
As William Smith points out, the systemic conception of deliberation does not
require a body of citizens with generally strong deliberative capacities; individual
capacities for deliberation need not be ubiquitous. Rather there may be room for a
diversity of skill sets and capacities of citizens. Smith’s argument is essentially an attempt
to replace the idea of a "good citizen" with the idea of a "good citizenry". (Smith 2019)
Deliberative democratic systems theory abandons the ideal of mass deliberation
and the goal of consensus. The hope of DDST is to have democracies that exhibit the
ideals of deliberation.

"[T]he hope is that configurations of governing practices and institutions
enable informed and sustained consideration of relevant reasons
(Mansbridge et al’s epistemic function), promote and safeguard mutual
respect among citizens (their ethical function), and elicit a plurality of
voices and claims (their democratic function)." (Boswell and Corbett
2017, 804)

Not to put too much emphasis on a single word, but it is indeed “hope” that drives DDST.
Though, to be certain the claim as it is phrased in the above quote does seem imminently
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feasible. It is certainly possible that some national practices and institutional designs will
be more conducive than others to the “sustained consideration of relevant reasons”.
There is no agreed upon definition of a deliberative system. Different theorists
handle the concept in a variety of manners, breaking down the system into various
conceptual components. Mansbridge et al. have done perhaps the most influential work in
launching DDST. They offer this explanation of their use of the term system:

"A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some
degree interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and a division
of labour, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole. It requires
both differentiation and integration among the parts. It requires some
functional division of labour , so that some parts do work that others
cannot do as well. And it requires some relational interdependence , so
that a change in one component will bring about changes in some others."
(Mansbridge et al. 2012, 4)

A

deliberative

system

will

have

differentiated

parts,

exhibiting

relational

interdependence, and a division of labor between the parts. There are possible functions
in a deliberative system for protests, partisan media, scientific research, expertise, and
many more non-deliberative practices. Arguments made in one site may be tested and
evaluated in another. Decision making and deliberation labor may be decentralized and
widely distributed. In a deliberative system, legitimacy is derived from multiple sites.
(Mansbridge et al. 2012)
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2.2 - Connecting the Micro and Macro Levels.

Deliberative systems are a macro level phenomenon. This is to say that their
structure is distinct from micro-level deliberation such as deliberative forums. Neither are
deliberative systems merely comprised of instances of micro-level deliberation.
Deliberative systems are non-supervening; what is true of the whole is not necessarily
true of the parts. Deliberative systems are not reducible to the sum of their parts because
the parts combine to produce a function that no single part individually performs at a
smaller scale. This is all to say that the micro-level components of a deliberative system
do not cleanly aggregate to the macro-level.
To conceptualize macro level phenomenon, and their relation to the micro level of
the behaviors of individuals, I draw on the work of James Coleman. He provides a
framework for exploring the relationship between macro and micro levels of explanation.
This framework often goes by the name “Coleman’s Boat” since his diagram loosely
resembles the shape of a boat’s hull. (See the accompanying diagram) He argues that in
order to comprehend how macro level social phenomena affect each other we should not
simply seek out a relationship between the macro phenomena. Rather, we ought to move
from the macro-level down to the level of the individual, the micro-level, and then back
up again. In other words, we must understand the simultaneous interdependence of
individual behavior and macro-level social phenomena. While there has been a measure
of success in explaining how macro-level social phenomena, e.g. the Protestant religious
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doctrine, influence the values of individuals, and while there has also been a modicum of
success at explaining how individual values result in patterns of individual behavior,
there has been a dearth of both theoretical and empirical work on how the behavior of
individuals shapes macro-level social phenomena.(Coleman 1986)
Figure 1. Coleman’s Boat

A crucial point from Coleman’s work is that we ought not to think of the macro
environment as a constant when exploring the impacts of an individual’s behavior on
outcomes for that individual. Rather we must recognize the interdependence of the two
levels. Changes in the behavior of individuals themselves drive changes in the context
within which those individuals act, and thus feeds back to influence individual behavior.
(Coleman 1986) A simple example of this is that a person may own a house valued at a
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certain amount. However, if that person desires to sell their house, they are influencing
the supply of housing and the value of all other nearby houses for sale. By attempting to
sell their house, the owner actually reduces the value of the house.
Coleman describes a number of ways in which individual interests and behavior
can be configured, but also notes that his list is not exhaustive. These configurations are
ways that individual behavior can be “aggregated” up to the macro level. A market
institution is one type of configuration, and the type that corresponds to the example of an
individual selling a house in the preceding paragraph. Another configuration is an
authority system, such as a typical company. These systems combine both market forces
and hierarchy. And another configuration is in an institution of social norms that
sometimes arises from the common interests of independent actors. Other configurations
may involve relationships of trust or the impeding of the flow of information. Coleman is
making a plea, and providing direction, for research into the processes that give rise to
macro-level social phenomena such as the institutions and configurations mentioned
above. (Coleman 1986)
In conceiving of a democratic nation-state as a macro-level deliberative system,
deliberative democratic systems theorists are building on the work of Coleman, often
without realizing it. We are hopeful that nation-states may function in a deliberative
manner and are attempting to explain how smaller institutions, individual behavior, and a
variety of social structures may aggregate to form a macro structure that makes more or
less reasonable decisions. If we are to assess the overall quality of a deliberative system,
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we may wish to identify the component parts of the system and assess their contribution
to the overall outcome.
One consequence of this understanding of deliberative systems as macro level
phenomena is that the quality of a deliberative system is not synonymous with the quality
of public deliberation that obtains between citizens in the public realm. Public
deliberation is certainly a component of a state-scale deliberative system. But it is not
synonymous with it.
A second consequence of the complex nature of the aggregative, micro-macro,
relationship is that the quality of macro-level deliberation is not always improved by
increasing the deliberativeness of a particular micro-level site. Mansbridge et al.
explicitly state that a non-deliberative site can positively affect a deliberative system, for
instance if protests (which are not deliberative) bring an issue to the attention of sites in
the deliberative system that then include that issue in their consideration of relevant
reasons. “Sometimes associations that are internally non-deliberative and homogeneous
will, for that very reason, be able to assert a coherent public position and sharpen a public
debate." (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 6) Mark E. Warren corroborates this point, arguing that
the deliberativeness of a country is not the same as the quality or deliberativeness of its
institutions. “If angry demonstration is necessary to persuade others that they should
notice unpleasant facts, that is a contribution to deliberation - although the initial
intentions may not be ‘deliberative.’ “ (Warren 2007, 278)
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Deliberative systems are not tied to the scale of the nation-state. Rather, they can
exist at many different scales and with any number of persons. As a concept, they can
apply to the scale of a nation-state, but can also be applied to smaller scales such as local
governments and small private organizations, as well as applied to the global scale.
Indeed, as Dryzek notes, any system can be assessed for its deliberativeness. For
instance, one may ask about the deliberative quality of the global intellectual property
rights system. The system need not “be already deliberative - or meet some minimum
threshold of deliberativeness to be analyzed in this terms.” (Dryzek 2016, 211) While
these possibilities are interesting, this thesis is concerned with the scale of the
nation-state, while acknowledging the dramatic differences in scale that exist between
nation-states.

2.3 - Complex or Merely Complicated

The jury is still out on whether deliberative systems are complex or merely
complicated. Complex systems are highly interrelated to the point that predicting the
outcomes based on changes to a part is feasibly impossible. Complex systems cannot be
mapped. Complicated systems, on the other hand, can be mapped and have limited
interdependence of parts. Complicated systems have interrelations between components
but the contribution of each component to the outputs is traceable. Mansbridge et al. use
the term “complex” in a quotation given above, but it is unlikely that they had the
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question of complex vs complicated systems in mind when they wrote that. Later in the
chapter, they imply that deliberative systems are merely complicated by advocating for
assessment of its components and their contribution to the overall function. “In the
systemic approach, we assess institutions according to how well they perform the
functions necessary to promote the goals of the system." (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 10)
This line of research implies that the whole can be understood by examining the parts,
whereas a truly complex system could only be evaluated on the basis of its outputs and
outcomes.
In addition, most DDST theorists, though not formally stating such is the case,
imply that the object of their study is a complicated but not complex system. Many of
them attempt to conceptually map a hypothetical deliberative system. For instance,
Magnus E. Jonsson produces a diagram of the Estonian Citizens’ Assembly Process that
occurred from 2012-14. His diagram is divided based on the conceptual site of
participation (public sphere, representative realm, or democratic innovation) and
indicates which parties (citizens, president, parliament, NGOs) were involved in each
event. (Jonsson 2020) The literature does not offer an explicit answer to this question. It
will be assumed herein that deliberative systems are merely complicated.
One may conceive of a state as a deliberative system regardless of the form of
government. However, deliberative systems have a special relationship with democracy.
Democratic governance is the most conducive to deliberation and deliberation is of
special importance in democracy. Deliberative systems are an answer to the question of
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what deliberative democracy will look like. “ ‘[D]eliberative democracy’ will really mean
a deliberative system within which multiple kinds, modes, and levels of deliberation are
distributed throughout other institutions and systems (Mansbridge, 1999; Walsh, this
volume).” (Warren 2007, 287) I would add to this description that non-deliberative
functions may also be distributed throughout the system, potentially in ways that
contribute to the overall goal of deliberation.

2.4 - Conceptualizing Deliberative Systems

It is difficult to move from conceptual descriptions to real world descriptions of
deliberative systems. Jon Dryzek points out that the institutional design of deliberative
systems is likely to differ from place to place. For that reason, it is necessary to define
deliberative systems with reference to abstract components as opposed to particular
institutions. He offers five abstract components of all deliberative systems which appear
to be based on their function: public space, empowered space transmission,
accountability, and decisiveness. (Dryzek 2009) Another conceptual description of the
components is offered by Mansbridge et al., though their breakdown depends upon who it
is that is speaking/acting and what it is that they are speaking about. Their components of
deliberative systems are (1) binding decisions of the state, (2) activities related to
preparing for those binding decisions, (3) informal talk related to those binding decisions,
and (4) talk related to issues of common concern but about which the state issues no
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binding decisions. (Mansbridge et al. 2012) A consistent measurement of the quality of
deliberative systems, if it is to be based on measurement of the components, will require
a standardized conceptualization of those components. At present, there is no agreed
upon conceptualization of the components of a deliberative system.
The work being done to describe and assess deliberative systems is in some ways
similar to the work of Wolfgang Merkel and his concept of “embedded democracy”. Both
lines of work attempt to distinguish stable democracies from fragile ones. And both take
democracy to be far more than the presence of ostensibly democratic elections. Merkel’s
concept of embedded democracy is akin to descriptions of deliberative systems. He
argues that stable, embedded democracies are made up of five integrated regimes. In the
language of deliberative systems, we would call these components. Merkel’s five regimes
are elections, political participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the power
to govern.(Merkel 2004) Note the similarities to Dryzek’s components of a deliberative
system. Elections are an accountability component. Civil rights protect the possibility of
political participation, which itself includes activities like deliberation. Additionally, the
power to govern is equivalent to the decisiveness component of a deliberative system.
Perhaps more work could be done synchronizing deliberative democratic systems theory
and the concept of embedded democracy as both are concerned with the necessary
conditions for optimal democratic governance.
There is a bit more agreement on the functions of a deliberative system, though
still short of consensus. Perhaps the most widely accepted functions are those described
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by Mansbridge et al. The first is an epistemic function. A deliberative system ought to
seek truth, improve knowledge, and increase reason. Second, deliberative systems have
an ethical function. They ought to foster reciprocity and promote mutual respect. Third,
deliberative systems perform democratic functions of promoting inclusion and
egalitarianism. (Mansbridge et al. 2012) This triple function, three desirable outcomes
from deliberative systems, parallel a similar debate over the functions of deliberation in
forums. The most convincing position is that the epistemic function supersedes the
others, which should be thought of as mere beneficial byproducts.
Simon Niemeyer conceives of deliberative systems function in terms generating
legitimacy by connecting citizens via reasons to decisions about what should be done. He
frames his discussion in terms of information, itself divided into supply and demand side
effects. Trusted institutions providing accurate information are supply side. Citizens both
desiring of and skilled at the use of reason to select between arguments is demand side. A
deliberative system should promote deliberation among the public by incentivizing
citizens to act as truth seekers and reducing information costs by fostering reliable,
trustworthy, accurate sources of information. (Niemeyer 2014) One consequence of this
function of deliberative systems would be that they select for true information and against
false information. In general, a deliberative system ought to select against propagation of
false information, with the prevalence of false information decreasing as you move
towards the center or top of the system if there is such a place. If there is no center, then
at the very least the system should select for true information over time.
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Another possible function of a deliberative system is to foster consensus and/or
meta-consensus. There is much debate over the potential of deliberation to produce
consensus and/or meta-consensus. I reviewed some of this literature in the previous
chapter. To the extent that a deliberative system engages with citizens, rather than merely
extracts input from them, and if one is convinced by Niemeyer and Dryzek’s findings on
the generation of meta-consensus via deliberation, then it seems reasonable to assume
that a deliberative system would also function to foster meta-consensus. (Niemeyer and
Dryzek 2007) Indeed, that assumption is made in this thesis.

2.5 - Good Deliberative Systems

Given the above loose description of deliberative systems and their functions, we
can consider what distinguishes deliberative systems of high quality from those of low
quality. In general, the answer is how well the system performs the functions discussed
above. "On the most abstract level, we argue simply that high quality deliberation
promotes these functions effectively; low quality deliberation fails to do so as
effectively." (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 13) There are a few additional features that can be
specified which are conducive to accomplishing the goals of deliberative systems.
High quality deliberative systems will have many, many connections between
deliberative sites. There will be a multitude of lines of communication and information
transmission between sites of the system. John Parkinson writes, "[A] good deliberative
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system will feature a range of sites, a range of perspectives, and a range of
communicative modes along with some public decision-making mechanism." (Parkinson
2012, 169) Parkinson describes what he calls “stepped pluralism” in which the default
mode of communication is respectful and in which parties elevate to more aggressive
forms of communication and action only when one's concerns are not heard or respected.
James Bohman adds that "a deliberative system ought to be structured so as to promote
political interaction across various levels and types of institutions so as to achieve the
possibility for self rule." (Bohman 2012, 75) Mansbridge et al. concur, arguing that a
good deliberative system is likely to have redundancies such that a failure of one site in
the system is compensated for by another. (Mansbridge et al. 2012) All of this points to
high quality deliberative systems having many overlapping lines of communication.
Another trait of good deliberative systems can be found in their division of
deliberative labor. This applies in multiple senses. Many authors divide the functions of
deliberative systems between sites in the system. For instance, voting, protests, and
crowdsourcing comments on policy can all be seen as aimed at making the system
inclusive, i.e. serving a democratic function, but do little in themselves to foster rational
discussion. On the other hand, citizen assemblies, minipublics, and other experiments in
citizen deliberation perform an epistemic function via the weighing of relevant arguments
on the basis of reason. Despite the acceptance of this division of labor to some degree, no
theorists appear ready to completely divorce citizens from the role of reasonable
deliberation. Simon Chambers rejects the possibility that a healthy deliberative system
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would relegate the public to performing the mass participation function while elites
perform the epistemic function. Rather, a healthy deliberative system will engage
deliberatively with the general public at least somewhat. (Chambers 2012)
Thomas Christiano argues that a division of labor is compatible with deliberation
among citizens and is necessary due to the enormous complexity of governance. His
basic picture is one in which the citizens choose society’s aims, the experts decide on the
means, and representatives synthesize the two. However, individuals are not necessarily
relegated to a single role. He describes a kind of communication between all three groups
on the basis of overlapping understandings of some topics. Citizens are expected to look
into the adherence of representatives to public will and scientific truth. In this light, he
makes the argument that a high quality deliberative system, by fostering credibility in
various institutions, will aid citizens in deciding how to allocate their time and whether
particular issues of representation warrant their investigation. A good deliberative system
helps individuals determine how to allocate their personal political labor. (Christiano
2012)
MacKenzie & Warren add to Christiano’s description of deliberative democracy
by specifying another way in which labor can be efficiently allocated. Minipublics can
function as trusted institutions for citizens who make educated decisions about how to
allocate their time in assessing policy options. In addition, politicians can use minipublics
to research how the public might react in the future to policies that must be written now
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but regard issues which have little or no public salience at the moment. (Mackenzie and
Warren 2012)
As mentioned above, I argue based on the work of Simon Niemeyer that a good
deliberative system will select against false information and select for true information. A
similar statement holds for reasonable and unreasonable arguments. The better the
system, the better it ought to perform this function. Jane Mansbridge explicitly defends
this position in her article Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System but also notes that
judgements of deliberative systems depend on preconceived notions of “good” and “bad”.
One result is that “such judgements will always be heavily contested.” (Mansbridge 1999,
212)
John Dryzek introduces the concept of deliberative capacity as the measure of the
quality of a deliberative system. "Deliberative capacity may be defined as the extent to
which a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic,
inclusive, and consequential." (Dryzek 2009, 1382) Better deliberative systems have
more deliberative capacity than worse systems. Dryzek allows that deliberative capacity
extends beyond western liberal democracies and can theoretically be measured in all
regime types. He writes, “Political systems (including states) can be arrayed on a
continuum according to the extent of their deliberative capacity. At the negative end lie
not just autocracies but also routinized administrative systems and those dominated by
strategic machination or armed conflict.” (Dryzek 2009, 1380) This fits with our
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understanding of deliberative systems in which all social systems can be conceived of as
more or less deliberative.
Dryzek argues another point reminiscent of Rosenberg’s four tiers of discourse in
which discourse which is capable of reflecting upon itself is of the highest quality. "One
aspect of deliberative capacity involves a distributed ability to reflect critically on
preferences, including those about the structure of the political system itself. Thus,
deliberative capacity ought to promote the ability of a system to identify its shortcomings
and reform itself." (Dryzek 2009, 1393) That this meta-discussion, as I will call it, is
possible in a deliberative system is a signal of its quality. However, such high levels of
deliberation are not expected to be widespread or common in all but a few sites of a
deliberative system because they are generally unnecessary.
One expectation that follows is that, in a good deliberative system, representatives
and other concerned parties will discuss public opinion, not so that they can mimic it, but
so that they can understand it and factor it into their actions. Simone Chambers makes
this point that good representation in a deliberative system involves considering public
opinion in a deliberative fashion. This means asking questions about why public opinion
is what it is, it’s epistemic value, and whether obeying public opinion is best for the
public. Public opinion itself becomes an object of reflection. (Chambers 2012) We might
call this meta-deliberation as the public opinion is already thought to be the product of
deliberation among the people. John Parkinson makes a similar point arguing that a
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system is democratic to the extent that it is responsive, not obedient, to everything that is
said in the public sphere. (Parkinson 2012)
Almond and Verba’s concept of civic culture is potentially useful for deliberative
democratic theory. A civic culture involves a balance between political participation and
acceptance of political outcomes, i.e. a balance between advocating for one’s political
preferences while acknowledging the validity of the preferences of others.(Almond and
Verba 1963) I assume that a strong civic culture fosters high quality deliberation in the
public sphere. While some theories stress the importance of civic culture for the overall
quality of democracy, the concept of a deliberative system opens up the possibility that a
society with a weakly civic culture could still be relatively deliberative. This depends on
the system’s ability to harness the participatory/inclusiveness function of the polity and
channel it into high quality deliberation in various sites. Even so, a high quality of
deliberation in the polity is still related and contributes to the deliberative capacity of the
other spheres. We are in agreement that a strong civic culture will contribute positively to
the overall health of the democracy.
Finally, before digging into the actual efforts towards measuring the quality of
macro-level deliberation, one should be aware of the five potential pathologies of
deliberation identified by Mansbridge et al. (1) Tight coupling: institutions or sites in the
system are too tightly connected to allow for outside influence. (2) Decoupling: good
reasons arising in one site fail to penetrate and influence other sites. (3) Institutional
domination: a single site dominates all other sites. E.g. authoritarianism. (4) Social

76

MCCORMICK

domination: a particular social interest or class exerts excessive control over sites in the
deliberative system. (5) Entrenched partisanship: the citizens are so divided as to
frequently be unwilling to listen to those with whom they disagree. (Mansbridge et al.
2012) It is important to keep these pathologies in mind when observing a deliberative
system and assessing the value of the connections therein.

2.6 - Assessing Deliberativeness of Systems

There are two general strategies of assessing deliberative systems. One strategy
uses direct measures and focuses on the parts of the system and the components of the
process, while the other uses indirect measures and attempts to take a holistic perspective
of the deliberative system. (See accompanying diagram.)

"Studies using direct measures focus on the actual process of deliberation,
while studies using indirect measures assess deliberation based on either
antecedents (for instance, by measuring the extent to which conditions
necessary for deliberation are met) or outcomes of the discussion (for
example, by measuring post-deliberation changes in participants’
preferences)." (Bachtiger et al. n.d., 2)

The holistic strategy disregards the inner workings of the deliberative system in favor of
one or more metrics that claim to capture the quality of the system as a whole. Such a
holistic approach avoids the pitfalls of accounting for the ways in which non-deliberative
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sites and processes can positively contribute to the quality of a deliberative system. James
Bohman argues along these lines that a deliberative system should be tested as a whole
according to the degree to which it performs democratic functions such as representation.
(Bohman 2012) Unfortunately, he makes this argument as a side point while on the way
to another discussion, and thus offers little guidance on how to do this.
Figure 2. Process vs Holistic Assessment of Deliberative Systems

Another possible holistic perspective is to argue that mass political conversation
and political discussion by citizens in everyday life is a cumulative measure of the quality
of a deliberative system. Simone Chambers rejects a complete division of labor in which
one site of the deliberative system performs an epistemic function via rational discourse
while another site performs a democratic function of mass participation. She argues that
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mass deliberation by the general public is necessary in a healthy deliberative system and
that we can assess the quality of such deliberation as a test of the system as a whole. We
would need to know many factors about citizen conversations, such as the degree of
freedom and openness, the quality of reasons exchanged, the sources and quality of
information, the role of the media, etc. but would not have to address other sites in the
system as the public is taken to be the center of the system. Additionally, in a healthy
deliberative system, citizens are likely to discuss more than their preferences and reasons.
They will also incorporate information about public opinion in their discussions and to
reflect on the significance of such information. (Chambers 2012)
In the other general strategy, researchers work towards directly measuring the
components of a deliberative system and their respective contributions to a set of criteria
of high quality deliberation. Authors who work in this style essentially create two lists,
one of the components or sites of the system, and a second of the criteria for good
deliberation. They then attempt to match the sites to the criteria and to specify the
constructive relationships between the sites. Unfortunately, while many authors set out in
this direction, few provide a clear, comprehensive, and replicable analysis of a single
deliberative system.
Jane Mansbridge might be a middle ground between the two styles, as she
simultaneously argues for the centrality of everyday talk in a deliberative system while
also specifying how to assess the various sites of the system. She rejects a relevant
distinction between arenas that produce binding decisions and those that do not.
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Mansbridge argues that we can use the same criteria, though in different degrees, to judge
all arenas in a deliberative system. She envisions a spectrum of venues for deliberation
that ranges from the formal to informal. She does not find the distinction between arenas
that produce binding decisions and those that do not to be relevant. Good deliberation is
the same in all arenas, but our standards are higher in formal venues. (Mansbridge 1999)
She uses this understanding to make modifications to the standards of deliberation
offered by other authors. For instance, Mansbridge accepts Gutmann and Thompson’s
criteria of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability, but modifies them to be more
leniently applied to everyday talk. The less formal arenas ought to have a mixture of
publicity and privacy, accountability and independence, reciprocity and agonism.
However, the more formal sites in the deliberative system ought to be held to high
standards of publicity, accountability, and reciprocity.(Mansbridge 1999)
Mansbridge also generally agrees with Joshua Cohen’s criteria of good
deliberation, but also disagrees with Cohen that deliberation ought to solely aim at
rationally motivated consensus. According to Mansbridge, consensus is not a goal of
legitimate deliberation. Deliberation should aim at clarifying conflict, even sharpening it
if necessary.

"Formal deliberation, everyday talk, and other forms of democratic
participation should enable citizens to see conflict more clearly when that
conflict has previously been masked (e.g., by elite "nondecisions" and by
hegemonic definitions of the common good;) ... legitimate deliberation
should therefore meet the criterion of helping citizens understand their
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interests better, whether or not these interests can be forged into a larger
common good." (Mansbridge 1999, 226)

In order to identify gaps in a system’s deliberative quality, we must know the goal of the
system. (Mansbridge et al. 2012) As each site ought to be judged for its contribution to
that goal, though with more leeway for informal sites, we can assess the quality of a
deliberative system by the prevalence and quality of sites that work to clarify, but not
necessarily resolve, conflict.
Mansbridge et al. divide deliberative systems into four main arenas. The most
formal arenas are those that produce binding decisions of the state. These arenas include
parliaments and legislatures, as well as executives and bureaucrats when they produce
binding decisions. The next most formal arenas are those in which people perform
activities related to preparing for binding decisions by the state, but that do not actually
produce those binding decisions. These arenas include the offices of legislators,
bureaucrats, and lobbying organizations. Continuing on the spectrum from formal to
informal, the third arena of a deliberative system includes everywhere that binding
decisions of the state are discussed informally and without a direct connection to those
binding decisions. This third arena includes political discussion that occurs at a family
gathering such as over a Thanksgiving dinner table. The fourth and most informal arena
includes informal talk related to common concerns but about which no binding decisions
are made. This arena might include discussions of art, home decor, or debates about
whether Pluto is a planet. (Mansbridge et al. 2012)
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John Dryzek provides another schemata of deliberative systems, one with only
two arenas but three additional components, some of which specify necessary
relationships between the arena. Rather than a spectrum of four arenas ranging from
formal to informal, Dryzek divides the deliberative system into two arenas. These are
public space and empowered space. Empowered space is where binding decisions of the
state are made, and potentially activities closely related to those decisions, while public
space includes everywhere else. As for the three additional components, the first of which
is transmission. There must be an exchange of information between the empowered and
public realms. The second additional component is accountability. There must be some
measure of accountability of the empowered arena to the public arena. These points are
nothing new for democratic theory. Finally, the deliberative system as a whole must be
decisive. It must produce binding decisions. (Dryzek 2009)
Dryzek argues that the first four components (public space, empowered space,
transmission, and accountability) can be evaluated for their deliberativeness. One way to
do this is to apply the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen, Steiner,
Bachtiger, and Sporndli. Both spaces ought to be assessed for their inclusiveness, and the
system as a whole must be decisive. "A system with high deliberative capacity will
feature authentic deliberation in the first four elements (public space, empowered space,
transmission, accountability); it will be inclusive in the first two; and it will be decisive.”
(Dryzek 2009, 1382)
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The work of Boswell, Hendriks, and Ercan give some guidance for accessing the
transmission of information in a deliberative system. They advise assessing the quality of
formal processes by which concerned citizens may provide input that has potential to
reach to the empowered arena. Additionally, the use of minipublics and minidemoi to
advise empowered institutions is indicative of successful transmission between the arena.
(Boswell, Hendriks, and Ercan 2016) In a similar vein, Thamy Pogrebinschi suggests
evaluating deliberative systems, in part, based on the prevalence of such deliberative
institutions. She also advises considering the stated goals of those institutions, the topics
they address, and their position relative to other means of participation. (Pogrebinschi
2016) Returning to Boswell et al., their final recommendation is to assess the interaction
between popular narratives across realms. A high quality deliberative system ought to see
such narratives actively engage each other and evolve in response to that engagement. We
can also observe whether popular narratives flow both bottom up as well as top down,
and are thus capable of shaping the behavior of empowered actors. (Boswell, Hendriks,
and Ercan 2016)
Returning to Dryzek, he also discusses factors which tend to contribute to or
detract from the deliberative capacity of a system. He makes no claim to produce a
comprehensive list of such factors, but should such a comprehensive list ever be created
it would enable predictions of a system’s deliberativeness based, not on direct
measurement, but rather based on features of institutional design and demographic traits.
Dryzek argues that literacy and education rates have a positive relationship with the

83

MCCORMICK

deliberative capacity of a system. As does the existence of a shared language and dialect.
A culture of political engagement also ought to positively contribute to the system. As for
the design of formal institutions, Dryzek suggests that preferential voting systems
contribute positively to the capacity of the system. This is because such voting systems
encourage politicians to compete for second and third choice votes from persons outside
their party. This in turn fosters communication in terms acceptable to political opponents,
a kind of meta-consensus. As far as state structures, Dryzek remains agnostic as the
interactions are complex and it is unclear which are better or worse. (Dryzek 2009)
Dryzek also mentions factors which obstruct deliberative capacity. He argues that
religious fundamentalism impairs deliberative systems as the fundamentalists see no need
to communicate in terms acceptable to non-believers. Ideological conformity is another
concern. He gives the example of how, after 9-11, critics of presidential initiatives were
labeled unpatriotic. "If the state has an official ideological doctrine that is not readily
challenged, then deliberative capacity is impaired." (Dryzek 2009, 1397) Finally, Dryzek
mentions that segmental autonomy, in which different regions or groups of people are
autonomous, is detrimental to a deliberative system as those groups or regions have little
reason to talk with each other. He argues that any benefits for deliberation at the elite
level are more than paid for at the level of widespread deliberative capacity. All three of
these factors repress variation of viewpoints, a crucial component of high quality
deliberation. (Dryzek 2009)
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Another schemata of a deliberative system is proposed by Thomas Christiano and
fits quite nicely with some previous, non-deliberative, conceptual models of democratic
theory. He is explicitly addressing the division of labor in a deliberative system and
attempting to describe that division. I envision Christiano’s model in the shape of an
upward pointing triangle, with each corner representing a different group of actors. At the
top corner are the politicians and their empowered arena that produces binding decisions
of the state. One of the lower corners represents experts with expertise related to a policy
area in which binding decisions are made while the other corner represents ordinary
non-expert citizens. In theory, the ordinary citizens send policy goals to the politicians
and the experts send information on the optimal means to achieving those goals to the
politicians. (Christiano 2012)
But this division of labor comes with two problems, as Christiano recognizes and
addresses. One problem is an instance of the principal-agent problem with citizens as the
principals and politicians as the agents. The question is how to ensure that the agents
fulfill the wishes of the principals, that the policy goals of the citizens are faithfully
pursued by the politicians. The second problem applies to the link between experts and
politicians. The question is how to ensure the sensitivity of the politicians to the
knowledge of the experts. Christiano terms this a truth-sensitivity problem. It is worth
noting that not the bottom corners of the triangle, citizens and experts, are also in
connection. Ideally citizens send research objectives to the experts while experts send
information necessary for the citizens to assess the faithfulness of the representatives.
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Christiano argues that there are four mechanisms that can contribute to solving the
principal-agent problem between citizens and representatives and by solving the truth
sensitivity problem between experts and both representatives as well as citizens. These
mechanisms are solidarity, overlapping understanding, competition, and sanctions.
Solidarity between groups increases faithfulness. Overlapping understanding allows for
dissemination of expert knowledge in terms accessible to non-experts for purposes of
assessing the faithfulness of representatives. Competition and sanctions both foster
knowledgeable experts and faithful representatives. (Christiano 2012)
MacKenzie and Warren offer a description of the role of minipublics and other
deliberative innovations that combine both expert knowledge and citizen input into a
general picture of a deliberative system. Minipublics can foster trust connections, akin to
trusted experts from the perspective of both citizens and politicians. Citizens may trust
the results of minipublics on complicated topics. Citizens may trust a minipublic as a
source of reliable information, and potentially as the source of a more well-reasoned
opinion than an unaided citizen can produce. In such cases, the citizen essentially
delegates some sensemaking work to the minipublic and is free to spend more time
elsewhere. Politicians, on the other hand, appreciate minipublics for their capacity to
offer insights on issues of temporal complexity, about which it is difficult to predict the
future opinion of citizens. Representatives may trust the predictive power of minipublics
regarding what people will care about under possible future circumstances. This is
especially true on topics about which the public has yet to form an opinion. Politicians
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often must make decisions today about policy that will affect yet to emerge technology.
Once such tech becomes commonplace, the public will form various opinions of its use,
but politicians must decide policy in advance of public awareness and can pay high costs
if they predict poorly what the public will desire. In this case, politicians can look to
minipublics as a source of information on what a considered public opinion on the topic
may well look like. (Mackenzie and Warren 2012) If we add this visually into the
triangular diagram mentioned above, minipublic might be a point within the triangle,
connected to all three corners (citizens, experts, politicians).
In 2018, we get perhaps the most explicit plan for measuring macro level
deliberation from Fleuß, Helbig, Schaal. However, even this plan leaves much open to
future researchers and leaves us a long way off from a standardized measure of macro
deliberation. It is really a checklist of four steps for future researchers who do make a
plan to study macro deliberation. First, select a theory of democracy. Second, choose a
concept of deliberation. The authors acknowledge that results will not be comparable
across different theories of democracy and conceptions of deliberation. Third, select the
loci that the researcher wishes to evaluate. The authors break down loci into three
categories based on their level of formality. They recommend using different
measurement standards for each level of formality. Unfortunately, they do not offer a
standard method by which to select the loci for measurement. (Fleuß, Helbig, and Schaal
2018)
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2.7 - An Aggregation Rule

The fourth of Fleuß et al.’s parameters for a macro deliberation measurement
scheme is the selection of an aggregation rule. This is easily the most complex parameter
and their work here is their strongest contribution towards a standardized measurement
based on combining components. Two issues must be resolved by the aggregation rule:
weighting of loci and how to combine their scores. Fleuß et al. argue that the loci ought
to be weighted according to their level of transmission. Transmission can be measured by
tracking topics as they move through the deliberative system, by tracking actors and their
connections between loci, or by observing loci directly with regard to their information
import and export. This third method is the one that the authors recommend. As far as
combining scores from multiple loci, there are two options: addition and multiplication.
The authors argue that addition is appropriate when loci are complementary, i.e. when
one can be substituted for another, such as between news media organizations. In these
cases, the impact or contribution of one loci has no bearing on the impact of contribution
of the other. However, when loci are non-complementary, i.e. when there is no adequate
substitute for a loci, as is the case with a legislature, then the scores ought to be
multiplied. This makes sense as a score of 0 in a legislature could render other highly
deliberative loci impotent. (Fleuß, Helbig, and Schaal 2018)
Fleuß and Helbig give some additional clarification on the aggregation rule in a
2020 paper. They provide three criteria. (1) The weight of the loci must correspond to
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their relative importance for the overall deliberativeness of the system. (2) Claims and
topics must flow from the public space to the empowered space in order to receive a
positive score. (3) Deliberative quality in different sites is able, at least to some extent, to
compensate for a lack of deliberative quality in other sites. (Fleuß and Helbig 2020)
The work of Fleuß et al. brings us close to the point where enterprising
researchers who wish to measure deliberation in a procedural fashion can put forward
candidate methodologies to standardize the measure of macro deliberation, at least within
a given theory of democracy and conception of deliberation. What is required of such
researchers is that they put forward a standardized procedure for selecting loci and
aggregating their scores.

2.8 - The Polity as the Unit of Analysis

While work continues on component methods of measuring deliberativeness,
others are reaffirming the polity as the appropriate unit of analysis. Writing in 2017, John
Dryzek argues for assessing the quality of a deliberative system by its effects on the
integrative norms of the polity. "We can judge the deliberative ill-health of a system
through reference to the conditions of normative integration and discursive engagement
in the polity as a whole." (Dryzek 2017, 627) Norms of respectful, peaceful, effective
deliberation ought to be held broadly in the polity of a healthy deliberative system.
Furthermore, there ought to be a connection between the range of acceptable discourse at
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the level of the polity and in empowered forums of decision making. An effect is good or
bad for the deliberative system depending on its impact on integrative norms. Dryzek
divides integrative norms into two types: substantive and procedural. Integrative norms
are substantive when the norms result in rough agreement on the relevant discourse. This
is a kind of meta-consensus on the legitimacy of disputed values and the range of
acceptable opinions. Integrative norms are procedural when they concern how actors
ought to relate to each other, e.g. peacefully/violently, cooperatively/adversarially,
bargaining/argument. Dryzek writes that deliberative systems

“can be judged in terms of the degree to which they facilitate or obstruct
competent, critical, inclusive, and egalitarian communicative action in the
development of integrative norms. Integrative norms pervade a polity
whether deliberation is present or absent; it is deliberation that can expose
these norms to critical scrutiny." (Dryzek 2017, 630)

The final sentence of that quotation speaks to a kind of self-reinforcing power of
deliberation to foster the integrative norms conducive to itself and helps justify the
measurement of deliberative systems in terms of these norms. (Dryzek 2017)
Dryzek makes these arguments while attempting to reconcile opposing sides of
deliberative democratic theory which have been talking past each other due to being
operative at different scales but without acknowledging that fact. He argues that forums
only make sense within a deliberative system, and that a deliberative system can only
exist within a polity. Each plays a crucial role. Forums are the best way of ensuring
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healthy deliberative systems. An understanding of deliberative systems is crucial in order
to apply deliberative ideals at a large scale. But the contributions of forums and systems
must be assessed in terms of the polity. Dryzek provides an illuminating discussion of
how a polity ought to have a reflexive attitude towards integrative norms such that they
do not detract from the quality of the deliberative system. In brief, a high quality
deliberative system will avoid the pitfalls of false balance, in which unreasonable
positions are given credence ostensibly for reasons of balancing viewpoints, and false
closure, in which an issue is prematurely closed when debate ought to continue. This is
necessary so that concepts such as right to disrupt and balance are not exploited to detract
from the deliberative quality of a system. (Dryzek 2017)
Other authors also argue for centering the polity as the unit of analysis. Niemeyer,
Curato, and Bächtiger argue for the polity as the unit of analysis. More specifically, they
"propose to shift the focus of assessment to the virtues and empirical manifestations of
deliberative action." (Niemeyer, Curato, and Bachtiger 2016) Deliberative outputs are a
demonstration of deliberative capacity. While centering the polity, they also recognize the
possibility that the polity will affect and be affected by people and events outside of its
borders. Factors beyond a state’s borders can therefore impact the deliberative capacity of
a polity. As for measuring the components within the deliberative system, they
recommend using tools like the DQI, the gold standard in measuring deliberation in
forums, to assess empowered spaces like parliaments. Public space can be assessed using
media studies and content analysis of newspapers, television, and social media. They
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claim this is justified because, “it is only through media that the public can forge
meaningful connection to discourses and views they would otherwise not encounter in
their daily lives.” (13) Finally, the deliberative capacity of citizens can be assessed using
survey data. (Niemeyer, Curato, and Bachtiger 2016)

2.9 - Alternative Approaches to Assessing Deliberative Systems

Some approaches do not fit neatly into either holistic or components based
approaches. For instance, Boswell and Corbett argue that deliberative systems ought to be
assessed via comparison. They advocate looking for family resemblances between
systems, as well as making post hoc comparisons of their affinities, rather than stressing
the identification of identical institutional formations and governmental practices.
Researchers ought to engage with in-depth case research in order to find “eclectic
affinities”. (Boswell and Corbett 2017) While this approach may be useful, it does
provide a route to standardized measures of deliberativeness across polities. It may also
be more useful advice for researchers who have been overly focused on the identification
of sites of deliberation, rather than concerned with necessary realms and components of a
deliberative system.
Work by Markus Holdo also falls outside the standard approaches but seems like a
bridge too far for producing a standardized measurement of deliberative system. He
advocates a relational analysis of deliberative systems that is conscious of the mutually
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influential relationship between individual behavior and a deliberative system. This
approach is especially useful for identifying shortcomings in particular deliberative
systems. (Holdo 2020) However, his work leaves us no closer to a solution for
standardized macro level measurement of deliberativeness.
In summary, authors have generally advocated for one of two different approaches
to measuring the deliberativeness of a system: either a holistic and functional approach or
a process based approach involving direct measure of the sites and transmission of the
system.
Simone Chambers’ holistic approach advocates for measuring citizen deliberative
capacity across a variety of measures as citizens are the center, and most important part,
of the deliberative system. However, in order to defend this method, she rejects the
possibility that non-deliberative behavior in one realm of the system could positively
contribute to the overall deliberative capacity of the system. As far as I am aware, there is
no proposed holistic method of measuring the deliberativeness of the system that retains
the assumption that non-deliberative practices in one realm can positively contribute to
the overall deliberativeness of the system.
As for process based systemic approaches, they require specification of sites of
deliberation and their respective relationships. No author has presented a comprehensive
picture of the sites in a deliberative system and their relationships. There are a variety of
competing models of deliberative systems and no author has presented a standardized
method of selecting sites of a deliberative system that ought to be measured. Anyone who
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wishes to use a process based measurement approach must present a standardized method
for selecting loci to be measured, as well as an aggregation rule. This would at least allow
their work to be replicated even if academic dispute continues on the quality of the
method.

2.10 - Extant Measures of Nation-State Deliberativeness

Regarding cross-national comparison of the quality of deliberative systems, there
is no extant direct or indirect measure in use. While there are various projects that assess
the quality of democracy cross-nationally, there is only one that attempts to assess the
quality of deliberativeness, or deliberative democracy, across states: Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem). Unfortunately V-Dem’s methodology involves neither direct
measure of the process and components of deliberation, nor indirect measure of
deliberativeness based on outputs or outcomes. Rather, their data on this topic are derived
entirely from the opinions of experts and analysts. To be fair, I am not arguing that the
V-Dem deliberativeness scores are meaningless. V-Dem uses various strategies, including
bridge and lateral coding, to standardize the opinions of their experts and analysts.
Through these measures, they hope to mitigate the inherently subjective nature of their
measure. (V Dem Varieties of Democracy Codebook 2021) But there are further
problems with V-Dem’s methodology.
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It is likely that V-Dem’s scores represent a reasonable estimate of the qualities of
deliberation about which the experts are queried. However, as Fleuß and Helbig point
out, V-Dem does not ask about deliberation at all levels of society, and this despite
ostensibly adhering to an understanding of deliberative democracy as dependent on
deliberative quality at all levels. V-Dem does not specify the various levels that ought to
be considered. Many of the questions asked of their experts apply only to deliberation by
political elites. Additionally, there is no avenue by which everyday political talk could
enter into the results. (Fleuß and Helbig 2020) Finally, by claiming that nation-state
deliberativeness depends on respectful dialogue at all levels, V-Dem may be violating a
common assumption in DDST, and one maintained in this thesis, that anti-deliberative
actions in one location of the system can produce positive results in overall quality of the
deliberative system. While V-Dem’s deliberative component index is potentially useful, it
does not satisfy DDST’s desire for a standardized, objective, and replicable measure of
nation-state scale deliberativeness.
There are other projects that aim to measure the level of democracy across states
but that pay little attention to deliberation. For example, Democracy Barometer makes no
mention of deliberation in the codebook for their measurement instrument. (Democracy
Barometer: Codebook: Version 7 2020) Freedom House is similar, with no mention of
deliberation in their codebook. (Freedom in the World 2021 Methodology 2021)
However, these projects and others like the World Values Survey, may yet be of some use
if they contain raw data that can be used to derive an indirect measure of deliberation.
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Chapter 3 Advancing the Measure of Deliberative Systems

As we have seen, theorists have a variety of conceptual models of deliberative
systems, made up of different components. In broad strokes, the method of assessing a
deliberative system is to, first, choose a conceptual model of a deliberative system. Next,
select sites representative of or crucial to the functioning of the system. Then, while
keeping an eye out for pathologies of deliberation, assess the relationships between the
sites and make a qualitative judgment about the systemic performance. The researchers
discussed in the previous chapters have brought us closer to a standardized measurement
instrument that produces replicable data, but we are still a long way off from such a
measure. No theorist has yet proposed such a measurement instrument, and even if a
theorist did, we ought to expect a great deal of debate before any instrument becomes a
widely used standard tool.
In the following two sections, I offer contributions to the growing debate on the
measurement of deliberative systems. The first section advances direct, process-based
methods of measurement. I begin with a clarification of terminology. I then offer a
conceptual model of a deliberative system and its components, clarifying when and
where non-deliberative behavior can contribute positively to the overall deliberativeness
of the system. In addition, I discuss various methods of assessing the spheres and
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components of a deliberative system, including an example of a possible site selection
methodology.
In the second section of this chapter, I argue for a holistic, outcome-based
measure of the deliberativeness of nation-states. The measure is based on the level of
meta-consensus within a polity, but is also tempered by the levels of freedom in the
country. I argue that meta-consensus indicates either deliberation or coercion. Thus,
controlling for the level of freedom of expression in a state ought to improve the validity
of meta-consensus as a measure of deliberative system quality.

3.1 - Process-Based Measure of Deliberative Systems

First, a clarification of terminology used to describe deliberative systems is in
order. Beginning with the broadest undefined term in use by theorists, the components of
deliberative systems are conceptual pieces of the system. Components are universal to all
deliberative systems. That is not to say that a particular system has all the components,
but that any system being assessed for its deliberativeness must be assessed for all of the
components. Components can be either regions of the system, which are referred to as
spheres or spaces, or traits of the system. Recall Dryzek’s components of a deliberative
system: public space, empowered space, transmission, accountability, decisiveness. Some
of these components are regions while others are traits. Perhaps the defining feature of
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components is that each one requires its own measure and that every component is
included in an aggregation rule.
Spheres, the regional components of deliberative systems, are comprised of sites,
also known as loci. Most importantly, sites are unique, rather than universal. A site is a
specific organization or group of individuals. Examples of sites include, a news media
outlet, a protest rally, a business, a court circuit, and an individual courtroom. Sites are
defined by their boundaries in time and space, as well as by their members if they include
more than one individual.
My conceptual model of a deliberative system (see Figure 3) has six components.
These are (1) decisiveness, (2) an empowered sphere, (3) a formal-public sphere, (4) an
informal-public sphere, (5) transmission, and (6) accountability. These components are
the same as those proposed by Dryzek except that I have divided the public sphere into
two parts, formal and informal. This division is inspired by Mansbridge’s work which
distinguishes between formal and informal communication. This division also appears to
align with Habermas’ differentiation between the political center, periphery, and civil
society. (Fleuß and Helbig 2020) The purpose of the formal vs informal division of the
public sphere is to isolate the regions in which non-deliberative behavior can benefit
macro level deliberativeness from the regions in which there is a negligible benefit to
non-deliberative behavior. That is to say that non-deliberative behaviors in the
informal-public sphere can positively contribute to the overall deliberativeness of the
system by raising awareness and demanding inclusion. However, institutions that attempt
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to formally discuss public issues are expected to adhere to standards of fair discourse and
authentic deliberation. In the formal-public sphere, just as in an authentic deliberative
forum, there is no benefit to the system from disruptive, non-deliberative behaviors.
There is some overlap between the spheres, in that a single individual can participate in
multiple spheres at different times. A person may have a day job at an interest group but
spend their evenings trolling people on the internet.
Figure 3. Conceptual Model of a Deliberative System

To visualize sites within the polity, one may picture a neural network in the shape
of a torus (a donut) with nodes throughout the volume of the torus, not merely on the
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surface. Each node represents an individual person. A business, a site made up of many
individuals, can be visualized by highlighting the nodes that correspond to the employees
and owners of the business. Figure 4 may help in visualizing a site within a deliberative
system.
Figure 4. Torus (The Brain’s Inner Map Is Shaped Like a Donut 2022)

I chose the torus shape because it has no center and no edge, but still has varying degrees
of proximity between nodes. This selection respects the strong emphasis that DDST
theorists place on the polity as the most important site in a deliberative system. One
might imagine the empowered sphere as the nodes along the inner ring of the torus. From
there, decisions feed back into the network, generating new discourse. As empowered
decisions are implemented and distributed throughout the system, individuals may
function like capillaries in the human circulatory system. In this way, mass deliberation in
public space is understood as a crucial component of the system.
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Each component requires its own measure. The component of decisiveness might
be more difficult to measure in deliberative systems without a monopoly on violence to
enforce their decisions, such as in a home owner association. However, in a modern state,
decisiveness is total and this component can either be expressed as “1” in an aggregation
rule, thus having no impact on a final score when included, or simply omitted entirely.
Measuring the regional components for their deliberativeness is more
complicated. The empowered sphere is the easiest to manage as the relevant sites are easy
to identify and can be assessed with Steenbergen et al.’s DQI. The relevant sites include
the legislature, the office of the president or chief executive, the high court, and agencies
empowered with decision making authority. Dryzek argues that spheres ought to be
assessed for their inclusiveness and accountability (Dryzek 2009), but I question whether
it might be better to measure those components separately and aggregate them at a later
point. For instance, inclusiveness may be another measure of transmission, which could
then end up being counted twice in a total score. Even so, if we wish to measure the
inclusiveness of the sphere, one possibility is to assess the political opportunity structure
of systems, a method first introduced by Eisinger in 1973. (Kriesi et al. 1992) On the
other hand, it may be possible to distinguish inclusiveness from transmission, in which
case each realm ought to be measured for its inclusiveness while transmission is assessed
separately and aggregated later in the process. I have no firm resolution to this question,
though later I propose a method of measuring overall transmission that does not take into
account inclusiveness. Another potential variable to measure in assessing the
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deliberativeness of the empowered sphere is the level of party discipline, specifically the
frequency with which legislators deviate from their party line in order to support
legislation. Including a measure of party discipline is potentially problematic but worth
considering.
One difficulty with a systemic process & component based assessments of macro
deliberation is that they require measures of far more than deliberation at the level of the
polity, which in my model is essentially the informal-public sphere. Process based
assessments also require a measure of how those factors are translated into quality
deliberation in the formal-public sphere and empowered sphere. A good deliberative
system can benefit from non-deliberative actions in the informal-public sphere and thus
some measure of those non-deliberative activities is necessary.
The informal-public sphere can be assessed for its deliberativeness using surveys
of individuals and experiments to measure individual deliberative capacity. There are at
least two types of data that we might wish to capture with these surveys and experiments.
The first is the actual deliberative capacity of individuals. This could be done by querying
them with open-ended questions on the rationale for both their political positions and the
positions of their political opponents. Those responses would then be subjected to
assessment using the DQI. We might also use indicators of tolerance and respect for
difference, such as a survey question about how they would feel if their child were to
marry a person holding different political opinions. The goal here is to see whether they
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merely endure their political opponents or if they actually respect their opponents as
holding potentially valid positions.
The second type of data that we might want to use are the citizen perspectives on
the deliberativeness of the polity. Though this is an indirect measure, and potentially
biased by many factors, it also may capture aspects of the polity’s deliberative capacity
that are otherwise overlooked by survey questions written by outsiders. These questions
might include asking participants how open ordinary people are to political discussion of
opposing viewpoints, or whether they think people are generally capable of responding
rationally to reason-based arguments. I leave it to future projects to determine the exact
questions and their aggregation.
Additional surveys could be conducted in order to produce data that can be used
to measure the degree to which issues important to the repondants penetrate both other
spheres. These would essentially be questionnaires about the issues of great importance
to the polity, followed by assessment of the formal-public sphere for discussion of those
issues. This will provide a measure of inclusiveness for those spheres, or alternatively, the
data can be used to contribute to a measure of the transmission within the deliberative
system.
It is difficult to specify how to include data on the deliberative capacity of
individuals. While a high deliberative capacity in the polity is almost assured to benefit
the overall system, the primary function of the informal-public sphere for the overall
system is to produce a wide diversity of ideas and arguments for uptake by the other
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spheres. The measure of the deliberativeness of the informal-public sphere should not be
weighted as highly as the importance of deliberativeness in the other spheres. Afterall,
the purpose of this distinction between the formal and informal public sphere is to isolate
the region in which non-deliberative behavior can contribute positively to the overall
deliberativeness of the system.
The difficulties of measuring the formal-public sphere are far greater than those
for the other spheres. In this sphere, countless varied private organizations are involved in
discussion and advocacy regarding public affairs. In the informal-public sphere we could
fairly sample the individuals since every individual is a member of that sphere. Simple
averaging could result in a standardized and replicable deliberative value for the sphere.
The empowered sphere could not be sampled, but all relevant sites can be identified for
measure. Again, though more nuanced aggregation ought to be used for the sites in the
empowered sphere, simple averaging would produce replicable results. However, to
assess the formal-public sphere, we cannot randomly sample from all individuals in the
polity since not all individuals participate in the formal-public sphere. Nor can we easily
identify all relevant institutions, as is possible in the empowered sphere. Hence, we need
a different method of generating standardized and replicable results. Once sites in the
formal-public sphere are identified for measure, various types of content analysis can be
done on their media to assess its deliberativeness. As all of the communications by
institutions in this category are part of an ongoing deliberation process, the DQI can be
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used to measure the deliberative quality of their media. This can be used as a proxy for
the deliberativeness of the site.
Perhaps the most significant remaining challenge in the measure of
deliberativeness in the formal-public sphere is the selection of sites for measure. I argue
that in assessing the formal-public sphere we ought to select the sites with the greatest
deliberative quality and highest levels of interaction with the other spheres. In other
words, we ought to look for the most deliberative, inclusive, and transmissive sites. This
site selection bias is justified for two main reasons. First, it is feasible. There are
countless sites in the sphere, but the ones with the greatest reach, i.e. highest
transmission, are also the easiest to find. Due to their great reach, they are also the most
influential. Second, the formal-public sphere is where I predict we will find the highest
levels of deliberativeness, though this is somewhat by design due to my deliberative
system model. Identifying the sites with the highest quality of deliberation will serve to
map a boundary of the deliberative system.
In general, I predict that the average deliberative quality of all sites in a sphere
will be greatest in the formal-public sphere while being lowest in the informal-public
sphere. Low deliberative quality in the informal-public sphere is not necessarily a
problem for the system. It is more important that this sphere be inclusive than
deliberative, even at the cost of being disruptive. The informal-public sphere includes
activism and narrative. It primarily serves the function of transmitting issues and
perspectives to the formal-public sphere. None of this is to say that citizen deliberative
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capacity is unimportant to the deliberative system. It is extremely important as it is tied to
the capacity for the other spheres to engage deliberatively with citizens.
The formal-public sphere is where we ought to find the most authentic
deliberation, sensemaking, rationality, and dispassionate empathy. I use the term,
deliberative channel to refer to the sites in the formal-public sphere where the majority of
authentic deliberation occurs. In this intermediary sphere, media engages with arguments
and information coming from both the formal and informal spheres. Alternatively, these
sites could be referred to as the deliberative bottleneck to the extent that they weed out
bad arguments and non-deliberative forms of communication coming from both other
spheres. Either way, as can be seen in Figure 5, a theoretical graph of deliberativeness in
each sphere depicts the peak of deliberative quality in the formal-public sphere. Peak
deliberative quality will likely be found in news media. This is in line with the
importance placed on a free press and the moniker or the fourth estate sometimes
ascribed to the media. Indeed, I agree with Joshua Cohen that the media plays a crucial
and largely overlooked role in enabling citizen deliberation and transforming results of
deliberative bodies into effective policy. (Cohen 2007)
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Figure 5. The Deliberative Channel

Recall that my division into these spheres is intended to capture the benefit of
non-deliberative behavior on the deliberativeness of the overall system. By isolating
potentially beneficial non-deliberative behavior to a single sphere, it is possible to
simplify the task of incorporating non-deliberative behavior into a standardized
measurement instrument. This move relies on an assumption that there is no benefit, or a
negligible benefit, from non-deliberative behavior that occurs in empowered sites or in
formal institutions held to a standard of authentic deliberative discourse. While an
organization may pull off a great hoax that raises awareness of an issue, such a site would
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be located in the informal-public sphere because its utility is in the inclusion it can
generate, as well as because the organization is not held to a standard of authentic
deliberation. The lower deliberative quality in the informal-public sphere is easily
explainable by the design of the spheres in my model, as well as if one believes that the
polity as a whole will be less deliberative than news media and legislators. The reason
that the empowered sphere is predicted to have lower deliberative quality than the
formal-public sphere is because the incentives for authentic deliberative style
communication are highest among organizations whose primary concern is credibility.
The empowered sphere is hampered in its deliberativeness by the gravity of its proximity
to binding decisions. It suffers from exclusivity, agonistic competition, bargaining,
obstructionism, and other tactics that interfere with authentic deliberation. As Mark E.
Warren points out, we should not expect deliberation in legislatures to be of as high a
quality as deliberation that occurs in bodies specifically convened for the purpose of
deliberation. Legislatures are fulfilling other functions besides deliberation. (Warren
2007)
In measuring the importance of the most deliberative sites in the formal-public
sphere, they must be measured for more than their deliberativeness. As mentioned earlier,
one option for including a measure of the transmission component is to weave it into the
measure of each sphere. In order to do this, the most deliberative sites in the sphere
should be measured, not just for their deliberativeness, but also for their transmission and
inclusiveness, which are opposite sides of the same coin. Peak sites ought to also be
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assessed for the diversity of perspectives with which they engage, even if merely to
dismiss them. Additionally, they could be assessed for rates of agenda setting, with lower
being superior for deliberativeness.
The overall goal in assessing the formal-public sphere is to assess the breadth of
coverage and audience reach of the most deliberative sites. I propose that we collect
measures of the following variables for sites in the formal-public sphere. First, we ought
to measure the deliberative quality of sites with tools like the DQI. Second, we ought to
measure the audience reach of sites in such a way that we can speak to what percentage
of the polity engages with media of a certain quality of deliberativeness. Third, we ought
to collect data on the percentage of issues important to the polity with which the site
engages. Notice that both the second and third measure require survey data from the
informal-public sphere, making this a complicated process. The final measure of the
formal-public sphere, once standardized, will be something like the average deliberative
quality of the fewest number of sites that together include >X% of important public issues
and have a transmission reach of >Y%. Such data can result in graphs like the following
examples that may be useful for categorizing deliberative systems.
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Figure 6. Transmission of Formal-Public Sphere Deliberation

Figure 7. Deliberative Quality of High-Transmission Sites
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Note that the values of >60% Transmission and Inclusivity are just hypothetical
suggestions at this point. In addition, there is no reason that the required amount of
inclusivity should be the same as transmission. Determining appropriate break points for
values of transmission and inclusivity will require assessment of deliberative systems for
patterns. We cannot know in advance whether the breakpoints are appropriate rather than
arbitrary divisions.
The concept of “critical citizens”, introduced by Pippa Norris, may be of some
use in an assessment of the polity and/or the formal-public sphere.(Norris 1999, 3)
Critical citizens favor democracy generally but are dissatisfied with the present state of
democratic governance. As Norris notes, in order to understand the democratic
legitimacy crisis, we ought to distinguish between objectives of political trust. Critical
citizens may be highly dissatisfied with the present state of democracy while still holding
underlying democratic values. This tension between ideals and reality is considered by
some to be healthy for democracy. As such, an increase in critical citizenry may be
preferable. These critical citizens will not only contribute to the overall deliberative
capacity of the polity, but they are also the citizens likely to seek positions at highly
deliberative organizations in the formal-public sphere. Such citizens may be an
invaluable asset to a deliberative system and we may wish to foster their emergence,
perhaps by emphasizing critical thinking in education curricula. Measures of “critical
citizens” could be a useful variable in more complex assessments of the deliberative
quality of the polity and perhaps the formal-public sphere.
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The fifth component in my model of deliberative systems is transmission.
However, in my model, transmission between the empowered sphere and the polity is
predominantly the function of the formal-public sphere. As such, in the measure of that
sphere, I have included a measure of transmission. No separate measure of transmission
is necessary. The formal-public sphere and transmission are inextricably intertwined,
especially due to the fact that my division between the formal and informal public sphere
is intended to divide attempts at authentic deliberation from more agonistic modes of
politics. Other theorists argued for assessing the transmission of each sphere and
weighting the spheres according to their transmission. I have essentially done this, but
only for the “middle” sphere. By using survey data on the issues of importance to
members of the polity and their representation in the formal-public sphere, I am
accounting for the transmission of ideas from the polity to other spheres, but the resulting
measure impacts only the value of the formal-public sphere. Basically, rather than
measure the ability of the informal-public sphere to transmit ideas to the formal-public
sphere, I advocate measuring the uptake of ideas in the informal-public sphere by the
formal-public sphere. There is also an issue of tracking the uptake of developments in the
empowered sphere by the formal-public sphere. I argue that this goes hand in hand with
the giving of attention to issues of importance to the polity, and thus no separate measure
of uptake from the empowered sphere is necessary. If others argue against this stance,
then a relatively simple fix would be to assess the fraction of legislation implemented that
is discussed by the selected sites of the formal-public sphere.
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The sixth and final component of my model is accountability. While I feel that I
have offered a potential contribution to the discussion of measuring transmission, I have
little to add regarding accountability. A significant problem in assessing accountability is
that accountability does not always positively contribute to deliberation. Constant
accountability can detract from deliberativeness. (Mansbridge 1999) For instance, a
magazine that is too accountable to its readers may not creatively explore topics that its
readers fear. Some accountability is beneficial, but it is not clear that more accountability
at all times and in all places is all desirable. As Warren points out, accountability is a
double edged sword. For instance, if politicians are highly accountable to their
constituents, to the point that there is low party discipline, then there may very well be a
higher quality of deliberation in the legislature than there would be if the politicians were
not so accountable. However, high party discipline tends to increase clarity of messaging,
which may actually enable the public to deliberate with more clarity regarding how best
to use their vote to hold parties accountable. (Warren 2007)
Another problem is that accountability may technically not be necessary for
deliberation. Rather, accountability is only necessary for purposes of representation. In
addition, participants to deliberation often attempt to represent the interests of those who
are not included, as when citizens of one country discuss local policy in light of potential
impacts on those living in other countries. Given that all modern democracies are
representative, perhaps a measure of accountability ought to be included. This could be as
simple as a measure of the freedom and fairness of elections, a measure that could be
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derived from the data of other projects. Alternatively, perhaps by limiting ourselves to
modern democracies, the level of accountability is not significantly different between
them. In this case, accountability could be represented by a dummy variable of “1”, or
excluded entirely.
Alternatively, a measure of accountability is not necessary if it is incidentally
included in the measure of the empowered sphere. Accountability may help determine the
minimum acceptable level of deliberativeness in the empowered sphere, though this also
depends on the successful transmission function of the formal-public sphere. When it
performs this transmission function well, the formal-public sphere creates incentives for
authentic deliberation in the empowered sphere. It also captures non-deliberative
behaviors and utterances for use in deliberation. When functioning well, the deliberative
system channels strategic intentions into talk such that the only method of victory is
through persuasion. (Warren 2007) The impact of the formal-public sphere, combined
with mechanisms of accountability, function to raise the quality of deliberation in the
empowered sphere. Note that deliberation in the empowered sphere does not depend on
the intentions of the participants, but rather on the incentives that accompany institutional
norms, rules, and constraints. In general, it is journalism that adheres to standards of
authentic deliberation and mechanisms of accountability that provide these incentives.
If it is the case that the deliberativeness of the empowered sphere is a function of
the accountability of that sphere to the polity, then a measure of deliberativeness in the
empowered sphere already includes a measure of accountability. We might attribute the
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effect of accountability to the distance “d” in Figure 5. Unless accountability performs
another function in the system apart from improving the deliberative quality in the
empowered sphere, there is no need for a separate measure of accountability. Just as the
measure of the formal-public sphere includes a measure of transmission, the measure of
deliberativeness in the empowered sphere may contain all of the necessary measures of
accountability.
While there are still many questions to be resolved, I can now give an example of
a potential aggregation rule for the values of these components. As mentioned,
decisiveness can be excluded since all modern democracies have a monopoly on
legitimate violence within their borders. The transmission component is subsumed in the
deliberativeness score for the formal-public sphere. The accountability component can
either be excluded or assumed to be subsumed in the deliberativeness score of the
empowered sphere. This leaves only the measures of the three spheres to be aggregated.
Because the functions of the formal and informal-public spheres are cumulative, i.e. they
can to some degree be substituted for one another, those scores can be combined
additively. Additionally, deliberativeness is expected to be extremely low in the polity or
the informal-public sphere, but this ought not detract from the overall system’s
deliberativeness as that is the sphere in which non-deliberative behavior can have a
positive systemic effect. For that reason, we should not multiply the score for the
informal-public realm in our aggregation formula. The opposite is true of the empowered
sphere, in which a complete lack of deliberativeness would render the entire deliberative
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system impotent. Thus the score for the empowered sphere ought to be integrated via
multiplication.
We arrive at an aggregation formula that will provide a cumulative score for the
quality of a deliberative system. In this formula, “A” represents accountability, “T”
transmission, “Pol” the deliberative quality in the polity/informal-public sphere, “News”
the measure of deliberative quality in the formal-public sphere, which in this case is the
deliberative quality of the minimal set of formal-public sphere sites that meet the
transmission criteria, and “Emp” the deliberative quality in the empowered sphere.

Deliberative System Score = (Pol + News) x Emp
News =

f(T)

Emp

f(A)

=

Deliberative System Score = [ Pol + f(T) ] x f(A)

The above formula is the big picture of how I suggest measuring the
deliberativeness of a democratic nation-state. I am not claiming that this is the final,
perfectly defined formula. It is likely that we will want to scale or weight the scores that
are multiplied in the final step, prior to that multiplication. Also, I glossed over the details
of measuring each of the three spheres, allowing simple averaging of scores once sites are
selected. I have no doubt that there are arguments for different methods of determining
aggregate scores for the spheres. In addition, I have not offered specifics of the survey
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data and methodology, rather I only go so far as to say that surveys will be the
appropriate way to collect the desired information about the polity. Similarly, with the
empowered sphere, I do not specify a standard methodology for applying the DQI to
those sites. Obviously, much work remains to be done. However, I do believe I have
offered one of the first conceptual descriptions of a standardized method by which
researchers could produce replicable measures of a country’s approximation of
deliberative democracy. In all humility, this is unlikely to be the model that wins
widespread acceptance, but perhaps it will contribute meaningfully to the ongoing
deliberations on this topic.

3.2 - Holistic Measurement of Deliberative Systems

Rather than breaking a deliberative system down into its components, measuring
each, and aggregating the scores into a total, one may attempt a holistic measurement of
deliberative systems. A holistic approach avoids the current disputes over the appropriate
conceptual model and components of a deliberative system. Rather, a kind of process
tracing can be applied to observe whether the outcomes and effects expected of a
deliberative system can be found in the state. These indirect measures require us to draw
data from the micro and/or meso levels of social structure. In terms of Coleman’s Boat,
we are following the formative connection down to the level of individuals, where we
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will observe their characteristics for evidence that a deliberative system is functioning at
the macro level.
An example of a holistic measure that we ought not to use is the level of equality
in a society. We cannot use equality as a measure of the outcome of deliberative systems
without making an unproven assumption that deliberation will result in greater economic
equality. There is a common and unwarranted assumption among deliberative democrats
that a more deliberative democracy would be more equitable. This includes an
assumption that current levels of inequality are rooted in interests and power, and
crucially that a rational defense of such inequality is impossible. A deliberative body that
decides to reduce the income floor or welfare provisions is certainly conceivable, but we
need more data to know whether deliberation will tend towards economic equality.
(Cohen 2007)
I argue that we can indirectly assess the quality of a deliberative system by
measuring the levels of meta-consensus and intersubjective rationality that are present in
the polity. Meta-consensus is essentially agreement on the relevant reasons and
preferences to be considered while intersubjectivity is a measure of consistency of
preferences between individuals with similar underlying values and beliefs. These are
two closely related variables, and it is possible that meta-consensus alone could be
sufficient to derive meaningful results. While deliberation serves multiple functions, none
is as important as its epistemic function. Indeed, as mentioned in a previous section, all of
its other outcomes are merely beneficial byproducts. Meta-consensus and intersubjective
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rationality are epistemic goods. The highest epistemic good would be knowledge of, and
consensus on, the optimal course of action. But this is an impossibly high bar, and
deliberation does not necessarily produce consensus. "[T]he aim of deliberation is to
arrive at rational consensus or at least some form of meta-consensus.” (Seitz and Votta
2018, 5) The primary goal of deliberation is to clarify, not necessarily resolve, conflict.
Meta-consensus is the clarification of conflict into a shared understanding of legitimate
reasons, even while differing in the weighting of the values underlying those reasons. I
concur with Dryzek that the polity is central to a democratic deliberative system and that
it is there that we ought to look for its impacts. He writes, "functioning democracies
feature substantial normative meta-consensus on the legitimacy of disputed values.”
(Dryzek 2009) I assume that a deliberative system will foster meta-consensus among
individuals in the polity and that the probability of gains in meta-consensus increases as
quality of deliberation increases.
The level of meta-consensus in a community might be considered a type of social
capital, a concept popularized by Robert Putnam. Alternatively, meta-consensus may be
thought of as a contributing factor to the social capital of a community. Social capital is
often divided into bonding and bridging capital.(Larsen et al. 2004) Meta-consensus
might be thought of as bonding capital as it builds trust and a feeling of similarity
between people based on their shared understanding of the range of acceptable political
positions. Alternatively, meta-consensus may be conceived of as a form of bridging
capital in that it crosses boundaries between political dissimilar groups. Or, if we keep the

119

MCCORMICK

concepts distinct, one might argue that meta-consensus fosters bridging capital, or that
bridging capital fosters meta-consensus. Either way, there is a connection to be made
between these literatures and more work could be done clarifying these conceptual
relationships.
My idea of using meta-consensus and intersubjective rationality in the polity to
assess the functioning of a deliberative system is largely derived from a 2007 article by
Niemeyer and Dryzek. Therein, they demonstrate that it is possible to empirically
measure meta-consensus and intersubjective rationality. In addition, their case study
shows a remarkable increase in intersubjective rationality following participation in a
deliberative forum. Niemeyer and Dryzek argue that ideal deliberation should produce
meta-consensus, defined roughly as agreement about the nature of the issue at hand.
Meta-consensus ought to occur if individuals behave with reciprocity and transcend
private concerns. In fact, they argue that it is by fostering meta-consensus and
intersubjective rationality that deliberation grants legitimacy. (Niemeyer and Dryzek
2007)
Niemeyer and Dryzek offer a conceptual model of a deliberating individual
wherein the self contains preferences derived from both normative and cognitive content,
values and beliefs respectively. Values are normative, while beliefs refers to
understanding of possibilities and achievability, i.e. facts about the world and causal
relations. Preferences regarding courses of action are a function of both values and
beliefs. These values and beliefs are not cleanly separable. Rather, they are
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interdependent. A person’s beliefs shape their values and their values shape their beliefs.
They consider the deliberating individual as a subjective whole, with both beliefs and
values rolled into a single concept of an understanding. Deliberation can contribute to
meta-consensus by changing a person’s reasons/understanding, i.e. their values and
beliefs. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007)
Their model has three subjective components (preference, values, beliefs), each
with its own corresponding form of consensus. "Normative consensus is agreement on
values. Epistemic consensus is agreement on how actions affect values in cause and
effect terms. Preference consensus is agreement on what should be done." (Niemeyer and
Dryzek 2007, 502) Additionally, each type of consensus has a meta-version that ideal
deliberation normatively ought to produce. "Normative meta-consensus can be defined as
shared recognition of the legitimacy of a set of values, while not requiring agreement on
the ranking of these values. . . Epistemic meta-consensus refers to agreement on the
credibility of beliefs and their relevance to the question under deliberation. . . . Preference
meta-consensus refers to the character of choices across options, and most
straightforwardly connotes agreement on the range of acceptable alternatives. . . .
Preference meta-consensus can also refer to the way choices among alternatives are
structured." (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 504–5) Measuring all three types of
meta-consensus has potential value, but preference meta-consensus is the single most
comprehensive metric. It alone may be sufficient for useful cross-national results.
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Intersubjective rationality is the connection from normative and epistemic
meta-consensus to preference meta-consensus. It describes a coherence between the
values and beliefs of individuals who agree on a preferred course of action.
"Inter-subjective rationality requires that the level of agreement among any pair of
individuals in terms of preferences should be proportional to the level of agreement in
terms of reasons (subjective agreement)." (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 516) The flip side
is that, when intersubjective rationality is present, individuals who disagree on preferred
the course of action will also disagree on the relevant reasons regarding that issue. If
rational individuals agree on the relevant factors, then they ought to agree on the optimal
decision. "Deliberation [by fostering intersubjective rationality] should, then, improve the
standardization of what should be done in light of any particular individual subjective
standpoint." (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 507) Deliberation contributes to intersubjective
agreement (rational consistency) by fostering a meta-consensus on valid reasons, which
itself then fosters consistent connections between particular subjective positions and
corresponding preferences. Deliberation facilitates intersubjective rationality, a rational
link between values and beliefs on the one hand and preferences on the other. If authentic
deliberation has occurred, then the deliberative body will be able to identify all relevant
perspectives as determined by a meta-consensus. An outcome is good if it integrates all
of the concerns present in meta-consensus. The better integrated, the better the outcome.
One caveat is that intersubjective rationality is not the same as a modus vivendi (a
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working agreement), which is often the product of less-than-authentic deliberation.
(Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007)
In order to measure these concepts, Niemeyer and Dryzek employ Q
methodology, “one of the few empirical methods available for the systematic study of
intersubjectivity that ‘has been informed by discursive and domination-free notions of
opinion formation’.” (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 508, quoting Blaug (1997)) Q
methodology is useful for studying subjectivity. It asks participants to rank variables
relative to each other, rather than on an abstract scale. This method is beneficial as
humans tend to think in terms of comparisons. Then, rather than comparing the variables
to each other to find correlations, the participants are assessed for correlations across
multiple variables. In Niemeyer and Dryzek’s case study regarding whether to upgrade,
maintain, or close a road through an environmentally sensitive area, participants
performed “Q sorts” of statements on a 9-point scale ranging from “most agree” to “most
disagree”. Participants performed one Q sort before and one after deliberation. Inverse
factor analysis was performed of the participants’ Q sorts. This allowed for identification
of archetypal positions on the topic at hand. A factor analysis was performed of the
weight of various factors. Additionally, content analysis of the deliberation was
performed in a similar but less rigorous manner to the DQI, and participant interviews
were conducted to hear from the participants about their perspective of what occurred
during the deliberative process. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007)
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Niemeyer and Dryzek find evidence of significant changes in epistemic
meta-consensus and preference meta-consensus, with minor changes in normative
meta-consensus. This fits with general sociological research suggesting that normative
meta-consensus is widespread. Most people appear to agree on the legitimacy of values,
but differ in the relative priority that they place on those values. (Niemeyer and Dryzek
2007 citing Rokeach 1979) There was an increase in the number of participants with
single-peaked preference distributions along at least a single variable. In effect, the
number of options for resolving the issue fell. Niemeyer and Dryzek argue that
intersubjective consistency is responsible for allowing a change in meta-consensus on
subjective factors to result in an increase in meta-consensus at the preference level. They
graph a scatter plot of the correlations between pairs of individuals subjective agreement
and preference agreement, before and after deliberation. Under conditions of
intersubjective consistency, “the level of agreement among any pair of individuals in
terms of preferences should be proportional to the level of agreement in terms of reasons
(subjective agreement).” (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 516) With the X-axis for
correlation between their subjective positions based on Q sorts, and the Y-axis for
correlation between their preference positions, then the regression coefficient indicates
the intersubjective Consistency (IC). They found that, “After deliberation, 56% (R2) of
variation in preferences can be explained by variation in subjectivity, up from 1%.”
(Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 516) Subjective consensus increased only marginally, while
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consensus among preferences increased dramatically, suggesting that preference
meta-consensus is the best measure of the existence of a deliberative process.
Niemeyer and Dryzek address a potential criticism of their work, that participants
initially had unsophisticated and inconsistent opinions on the issue of concern prior to
deliberation. Thus the gains in meta-consensus were the result of increases in
sophistication of the participants’ opinions rather than a product of deliberation.
However, the evidence indicates that there was a high level of internal consistency prior
to deliberation, thus calling into question that idea that participants had relatively
unsophisticated opinions prior to deliberation. The authors speculate that the distorting
effect of symbolic politics was responsible for the lack of meta-consensus, and that “the
deliberative process removed this distorting effect and produced a single meta-consensus,
resulting in a high IC among all participants.” (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 522)
Niemeyer and Dryzek “posited that inter-subjective rationality provides the lynch
pin between subjective and preference meta-consensus”. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007,
518) Their results suggest that deliberation produces meta-consensus by fostering
intersubjective rationality.
Unfortunately, deliberation is not the only process that might produces
meta-consensus. It seems plausible that meta-consensus could also arise through
propagandistic coercion. Therefore, we ought not assume that high levels of
meta-consensus in a polity is necessarily indicative of a high quality deliberative system.
In order to isolate the effect of the deliberative system, it is necessary to control for levels
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of propagandistic coercion. To that end, I argue for including a measure of freedom of
expression in the total score for a state’s deliberative system quality. A rough conceptual
formula would be as follows:

Deliberative System Score = (meta-consensus) x (freedom of expression)

However, controlling for freedom of expression may not be necessary if one is
researching only modern democracies, all of which have high levels of freedom of
expression. If it is assumed that freedom of expression is roughly equivalent across
modern democracies, and that differences in levels of freedom of expression are
negligible, then meta-consensus alone is sufficient to compare the quality of democratic
deliberative systems.
So how ought we measure meta-consensus and freedom of expression across a
polity? Niemeyer and Dryzek’s work illustrates a method for measuring meta-consensus
on a single topic. But overall meta-consensus in a polity is about countless topics. And
even if we only wanted to measure meta-consensus on a single topic, Niemeyer and
Dryzek admit that they are not offering a definitive method for the empirical assessment
of meta-consensus. (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007) They are merely demonstrating the
possibility of examining such concepts empirically. Another important difference
between their work and the project of measuring macro deliberativeness is that Niemeyer
and Dryzek did not have to address the problem of propagandistic coercion. Since they

126

MCCORMICK

have both pre-deliberation and post-deliberation scores, they can be relatively certain that
it was deliberation that caused the changes in meta-consensus.
One possibility for measuring polity meta-consensus is to stick with Q
methodology as utilized by Niemeyer and Dryzek, but to conduct surveys on a wide
variety of topics. Preference meta-consensus would be the most important type to focus
on. One way to measure preference meta-consensus is based on the prevalence of
preference distributions that are single-peak on at least a single variable. Additionally, a
measure of intersubjective consistency could be made on each topic, as was done by
Niemeyer and Dryzek. Unfortunately, the scale and complexity of such a methodology
may render it unfeasible.
Another possibility is to select a single topic for assessment, but this calls into
question whether deliberation on that topic is representative of the quality of the
deliberative system more generally. Researchers could select an especially important
topic which is the subject of much discussion, but I want to suggest another possibility of
using what I call a focusing event to justify the selection of a single topic for measure.
Outside of small experiments in deliberative forums, it is difficult to collect both
pre-deliberation and post-deliberation measurements. Most politically important topics
have been the subject of ongoing debate for quite some time, so it would be a mistake to
attribute a recent change in preferences to the effects of deliberation. Accordingly, the
methods proposed so far would take a snapshot of the state of meta-consensus in the
polity at a particular time.
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An alternative is to identify a topic of great public concern, on which there has
been little discussion, but which is expected to have much attention in the near future.
Basically, identify a novel public concern. If such a topic is identified early enough in the
process of its uptake by a deliberative system, then researchers would be able to survey
the polity both before and after a significant amount of deliberation. Then, comparisons
can be made between the change in meta-consensus over time in various states. This is
the one method that allows for a comparison of the rapidity with which a deliberative
system functions, although this introduces questions of efficiency which this thesis has
tried to keep distinct from a measure of quality of deliberation. And, this method of using
a focusing event must still control for propagandistic coercion in order to justify the
assumption that a change in meta-consensus was the outcome of a deliberative system.
Another possible benefit to this method is that it would capture a measure of deliberative
system performance capacity even if that system rarely performs up to that standard.
Joshua Cohen raised concerns that high quality deliberation is a fragile, precarious state,
prone to degeneration. If this image is correct, then high quality deliberation may only
emerge in periodic bursts, between which political communities devolve to a less
deliberative status quo. It is possible that only highly visible and impactful issues may
bring out the deliberative potential of a system. If this is true, then focusing events might
be the only means by which to capture a measure of a deliberative system’s quality.
As for measuring freedom of expression, there are countless possibilities, but for
the sake of simplicity and feasibility, one could use values from an organization like
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Freedom House which calculates an overall freedom score for each state. In a similar
research project to that of this thesis, Sietz and Votta use a measure of Freedom of
Discussion found in the Varieties of Democracy Project to control for regime support
based on coercion. (Seitz and Votta 2018)
Finally, perhaps the most feasible, though not the most accurate, method of
estimating the quality of a national deliberative system is to draw from existing survey
data, such as the World Values Survey, rather than designing and conducting novel survey
research. As extant surveys do not measure meta-consensus, we would use their survey
results as an indirect measure of meta-consensus, which is itself an indirect measure of
the quality of a deliberative system. The type of survey questions that we are looking for
are those that indicate the perceived legitimacy of the positions of political opponents. A
question about the ease with which one is able to discuss politics with members of
another party could be a decent indicator, as could the classic question about how one
would feel if their child married a member of a different political party.
Ideally, all of these methods should produce similar results. Additionally, the
result may align with the estimates of experts at the Varieties of Democracy Project
mentioned in a previous chapter. If it is the case that these independent and quite distinct
methods of measuring macro deliberativeness produce similar scores for countries, then
we can increase our confidence that these are valid measures of the concept of systemic
deliberativeness.
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3.3 - Policy Implications

The impetus for this project, and for other efforts at measuring deliberative
quality, is that we may have democracies that are stable, reasonable, and just. As such,
much of the policy implications of these efforts will be determined by the results,
assuming the measures are born out as valid. Without such results I can do little more
than specify some of the policy questions that I hope will be answered by continuing
research into deliberative systems.
Firstly, measurements of macro deliberativeness will enable us to assess its
relationship with state longevity. That is, we may be able to confirm the suspicion of
deliberative democratic theorists that deliberative quality is predictive of democratic
longevity. If confirmed, we are led to a plethora of questions about how to engineer and
foster high quality deliberative systems. We may find different methods work in different
spheres of the system. For instance, perhaps increasing participation in civic
organizations is low-hanging fruit for improving the deliberative capacity of the polity.
There may be valuable lessons about the appropriate balance between state funding and
market-based media that contributes to the optimal level of deliberation in the
formal-public sphere. If my model of deliberative systems is valid, then it is crucial that
we learn to foster highly deliberative media ecosystems. However, we are dependent on
the measurement results to offer more specific policy recommendations.
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Additionally, results may indicate a relationship between deliberative experiments
such as citizen assemblies and deliberative polling and the quality of deliberation in one
or more spheres. These data may help us design better deliberative forums and balance
between the hot deliberation of empowered forums and the cold deliberation of
disconnected forums. Both have their benefits and drawbacks.
Answers to these questions about fostering high quality deliberation are
increasing in importance as our information ecosystem continues to rapidly change.
Digital media, social media, private ownership of de facto public squares, fake news, and
the soon to be commonplace deep fakes all stress the urgent need for an understanding of
the quality of our deliberations. A deeper understanding of deliberative systems may
enable us to better spot and address potentially deleterious effects of developing
technologies.
Finally, the lessons drawn from data on deliberative systems may be applicable
for fostering transitions to democracy around the globe. If Merkel’s idea of embedded
democracy is correct, and if the normative intuitions of deliberative democracy theorists
are correct, then preparing the underlying conditions of deliberation and democracy may
be more important than setting up ostensibly democratic elections. The policy
implications for interventionist efforts at state-building, such as the 2003 U.S. invasion of
Iraq, are potentially massive. Plans for democratizations could be rewritten to focus first
and foremost on building bridging social capital and meta-consensus.
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3.4 - Conclusion

I have proposed two conceptual methods, consistent with the theoretical
foundations of deliberative democratic systems theory, for measuring the quality of a
macro level deliberative system. The first is a process based method that identifies and
assesses the essential components of a deliberative system for their functional
contribution to the deliberativeness of the outcomes. The second is a holistic method of
indirectly measuring the quality of a deliberative system based on the level of
meta-consensus in the polity. Each proposal is conceptually complete but lacks specific
details on operationalization. These ideas certainly warrant critique and I do not expect
them to be the final word in the theory of deliberative systems. If anything in this work
survives refutation, or contributes to advancing the ideas of another scholar, then, at least
in deliberative terms, this thesis will not have been in vain.
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